an:07192200
Zbl 1437.91188
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
EN
Games Econ. Behav. 121, 108-116 (2020).
00448575
2020
j
91B14
implementation theory; incomplete information
Summary: We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of \textit{B. Holmstr??m} and \textit{R. B. Myerson} [Econometrica 51, 1799--1819 (1983; Zbl 0521.90008)] in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called \textit{closure under interim utility equivalence}, and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called \textit{interim inseparability}, is also sufficient for the implementation of essentially single-valued social choice sets. The characterization results are then examined in a variety of environments.
Zbl 0521.90008