an:06527748
Zbl 1406.91138
Adamczyk, Marek; Borodin, Allan; Ferraioli, Diodato; de Keijzer, Bart; Leonardi, Stefano
Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
EN
Markakis, Evangelos (ed.) et al., Web and internet economics. 11th international conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9--12, 2015. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-662-48994-9/pbk; 978-3-662-48995-6/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9470, 1-15 (2015).
2015
a
91B24
sequential posted price mechanisms; continuous valuation distribution; optimal revenue
Summary: We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted price mechanisms are conceptually simple mechanisms that work by proposing a ``take-it-or-leave-it'' offer to each buyer. We apply sequential posted price mechanisms to single-parameter multi-unit settings in which each buyer demands only one item and the mechanism can assign the service to at most \(k\) of the buyers. For standard sequential posted price mechanisms, we prove that with the valuation distribution having finite support, no sequential posted price mechanism can extract a constant fraction of the optimal expected revenue, even with unlimited supply. We extend this result to the case of a continuous valuation distribution when various standard assumptions hold simultaneously. In fact, it turns out that the best fraction of the optimal revenue that is extractable by a sequential posted price mechanism is proportional to the ratio of the highest and lowest possible valuation. We prove that for two simple generalizations of these mechanisms, a better revenue performance can be achieved: if the sequential posted price mechanism has for each buyer the option of \textit{either} proposing an offer \textit{or} asking the buyer for its valuation, then a \(\varOmega (1/\max \{1,d\})\) fraction of the optimal revenue can be extracted, where \(d\) denotes the ``degree of dependence'' of the valuations, ranging from complete independence (\(d=0\)) to arbitrary dependence (\(d = n-1\)). When we generalize the sequential posted price mechanisms further, such that the mechanism has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the \(i\)-th buyer that depends on the valuations of all buyers except \(i\), we prove that a constant fraction \((2 - \sqrt{e})/4 \approx 0.088\) of the optimal revenue can be always extracted.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1326.68026].