an:05886239
Zbl 1211.91030
Do??an, Onur; Laffond, Gilbert; Lain??, Jean
The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
EN
J. Math. Econ. 47, No. 1, 60-67 (2011).
00277537
2011
j
91A12 91B60
joint preferences; couples; core; indivisible goods
Summary: We extend the Shapley-Scarf model of markets for indivisible goods without money to the case where couples of agents have joint preferences over the set of allocations. We show that the domain of (weakly) lexicographic preferences is maximal (for inclusion) for the existence of core allocations. This result also holds in the case where the set of agents is partitioned into non-empty coalitions with any size, as well as for the class of markets studied in [\textit{H. Konishi, T. Quint} and \textit{J. Wako}, J. Math. Econ. 35, No.~1, 1--15 (2001; Zbl 1007.91036)], where individuals exchange several types of purely indivisible goods.
Zbl 1007.91036