an:01929326
Zbl 1032.91095
Klijn, Flip; Mass??, Jordi
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
EN
Games Econ. Behav. 42, No. 1, 91-100 (2003).
00091369
2003
j
91B68 91A12
Matching; (Weak) stability; Bargaining set
Summary: In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of the members can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. Our main result is that under the assumption of strict preferences, the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings coincides with the bargaining set of \textit{L. Zhou} [Games Econ. Behav. 6, 512-526 (1994; Zbl 0807.90143)] for this context.
Zbl 0807.90143