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On the argument from physics and general relativity. (English) Erkennnts 85, No. 2, 333-373 (2020).

Summary: I argue that the best interpretation of the general theory of relativity (GTR) has need of a causal entity (i.e., the gravitational field), and causal structure that is not reducible to light cone structure. I suggest that this causal interpretation of GTR helps defeat a key premise in one of the most popular arguments for causal reductionism, viz., the argument from physics.

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References:


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