Roche, William
On the truth-conduciveness of coherence. (English) Zbl 1304.03027

Summary: I argue that coherence is truth-conducive in that coherence implies an increase in the probability of truth. Central to my argument is a certain principle for transitivity in probabilistic support. I then address a question concerning the truth-conduciveness of coherence as it relates to (something else I argue for) the truth-conduciveness of consistency, and consider how the truth-conduciveness of coherence bears on coherentist theories of justification.

MSC:
03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03A10 Logic in the philosophy of science
03B48 Probability and inductive logic

Full Text: DOI

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