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**Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing.** (English) Zbl 1396.91122  
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Summary: Manipulation of indirect elections by vote pairing occurs when a group of voters in different electoral bodies secures a jointly preferred winner by performing pairwise exchanges of votes. We show that in elections involving a large enough number of districts, each with a large enough size, no reasonable constitution is immune to vote-pairing.

**MSC:**

[91B12](#) Voting theory

**Keywords:**

[representative democracy](#); [vote pairing](#); [group manipulation](#)

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