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Slow motion zero knowledge identifying with colliding commitments. (English) [Zbl 1409.94872](#)
Lin, Dongdai (ed.) et al., Information security and cryptology. 11th international conference, Inscrypt 2015, Beijing, China, November 1–3, 2015. Revised selected papers. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 9589, 381-396 (2016).

Summary: Discrete-logarithm authentication protocols are known to present two interesting features: the first is that the prover's commitment, $x = g^r$, claims most of the prover's computational effort. The second is that x does not depend on the challenge and can hence be computed in advance. Provers exploit this feature by pre-loading (or pre-computing) ready to use commitment pairs r_i, x_i . The r_i can be derived from a common seed but storing each x_i still requires 160 to 256 bits when implementing DSA or Schnorr.

This paper proposes a new concept called slow motion zero-knowledge (SM-ZK). SM-ZK allows the prover to slash commitment size (by a factor of 4 to 6) by combining classical zero-knowledge and a timing channel. We pay the conceptual price of requiring the ability to measure time but, in exchange, obtain communication-efficient protocols.

For the entire collection see [\[Zbl 1337.94003\]](#).

MSC:

[94A60](#) Cryptography

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