

[Mori, Osamu](#)

Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and dictatorship. (English) Zbl 1094.91508
[Theory Decis. 55, No. 3, 257-272 \(2003\)](#).

Summary: The author investigates the possibility of a dictatorship in the context of Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem. Preliminarily, some propositions about Harsanyi's Theorem are presented using an alternative principle that he names Quasi-strong Pareto, which is the latter part of Strong Pareto. Then he defines dictatorship as a requirement that social preference agrees with a dictator's preference or those of members of dictatorial group even if their preferences strictly contradict those of all other people in the society. Conclusively, although in each version of Harsanyi's Theorem with Pareto Indifference, Weak Preference Pareto or Weak Pareto the social utility function may have a form of dictatorship, however if individuals' vNM utility functions are all 'individualistic' and Quasi-strong Pareto is satisfied, then the dictatorship is excluded.

MSC:

[91B14](#) Social choice

Keywords:

[independent prospects](#); [quasi-strong Pareto](#); [utilitarianism](#)

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