

Wang, YunTong**The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model.** (English)

Zbl 0971.91509

Econ. Lett. 64, No. 2, 187-192 (1999).

Summary: The paper considers the discrete cost sharing model first studied in *H. Moulin's* paper ["On additive methods to share joint costs", Jpn. Econ. Rev. 46, No. 4, 303-332 (1995; doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00024.x)]. It shows that the set of additive rules satisfying the dummy axiom is the set of all convex combinations of the path generated rules.

MSC:

91B32 Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

91A12 Cooperative games

Cited in 1 Review
Cited in 12 Documents**Keywords:**

cost sharing; additivity; dummy axioms

Full Text: DOI**References:**

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