×

Cooperation in finitely repeated non-cooperative games. (English) Zbl 0659.90104

Compromise, negotiation and group decision, 3rd. Int. Conf. Found. Appl. Utility, Risk Dec. Theories, FUR-III, Theory Decis. Libr., Ser. C 1, 159-173 (1988).
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0658.00022.]
This paper is concerned with eliciting cooperative behavior in two- persons finitely repeated non-cooperative games. It is argued that whenever there are three equilibria such that the players’ preferences are in reversed order, then, under some conditions, cooperation may be initiated and recursively maintained leading to a unique point on the Pareto frontier. This is discussed by means of examples with an application to spatial collusion.

MSC:

91A20 Multistage and repeated games
91A10 Noncooperative games
91A12 Cooperative games

Citations:

Zbl 0658.00022