Moreaux, Michel; Ponssard, Jean-Pierre; Rey, Patrick Cooperation in finitely repeated non-cooperative games. (English) Zbl 0659.90104 Compromise, negotiation and group decision, 3rd. Int. Conf. Found. Appl. Utility, Risk Dec. Theories, FUR-III, Theory Decis. Libr., Ser. C 1, 159-173 (1988). [For the entire collection see Zbl 0658.00022.] This paper is concerned with eliciting cooperative behavior in two- persons finitely repeated non-cooperative games. It is argued that whenever there are three equilibria such that the players’ preferences are in reversed order, then, under some conditions, cooperation may be initiated and recursively maintained leading to a unique point on the Pareto frontier. This is discussed by means of examples with an application to spatial collusion. Cited in 1 Document MSC: 91A20 Multistage and repeated games 91A10 Noncooperative games 91A12 Cooperative games Keywords:cooperative behavior; two-persons finitely repeated non-cooperative games; spatial collusion Citations:Zbl 0658.00022 PDFBibTeX XML