Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic Information design in multistage games. (English) Zbl 07791571 Theor. Econ. 18, No. 4, 1475-1509 (2023). MSC: 91A20 91A28 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Makris} and \textit{L. Renou}, Theor. Econ. 18, No. 4, 1475--1509 (2023; Zbl 07791571) Full Text: DOI arXiv OA License
Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj Conveying value via categories. (English) Zbl 07791569 Theor. Econ. 18, No. 4, 1407-1439 (2023). MSC: 91A28 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Onuchic} and \textit{D. Ray}, Theor. Econ. 18, No. 4, 1407--1439 (2023; Zbl 07791569) Full Text: DOI arXiv OA License
Sadakane, Hitoshi Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers. (English) Zbl 07753513 Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 267-301 (2023). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{H. Sadakane}, Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 267--301 (2023; Zbl 07753513) Full Text: DOI OA License
Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L. Pervasive signaling. (English) Zbl 07753510 Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 163-196 (2023). MSC: 91A28 91D30 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{B. D. Bernheim} and \textit{A. L. Bodoh-Creed}, Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 163--196 (2023; Zbl 07753510) Full Text: DOI OA License
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig Slow persuasion. (English) Zbl 07753509 Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 129-162 (2023). MSC: 91B44 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Escudé} and \textit{L. Sinander}, Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 129--162 (2023; Zbl 07753509) Full Text: DOI arXiv OA License
Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Smorodinsky, Rann; Yamashita, Takuro Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling. (English) Zbl 07753505 Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 15-36 (2023). MSC: 91B03 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{I. Arieli} et al., Theor. Econ. 18, No. 1, 15--36 (2023; Zbl 07753505) Full Text: DOI OA License
Blume, Andreas; Park, In-Uck Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals. (English) Zbl 07759617 Theor. Econ. 17, No. 3, 1183-1223 (2022). MSC: 91A28 91A27 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Blume} and \textit{I.-U. Park}, Theor. Econ. 17, No. 3, 1183--1223 (2022; Zbl 07759617) Full Text: DOI OA License
Kosterina, Svetlana Persuasion with unknown beliefs. (English) Zbl 07759614 Theor. Econ. 17, No. 3, 1075-1107 (2022). MSC: 91A28 91B03 91B43 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{S. Kosterina}, Theor. Econ. 17, No. 3, 1075--1107 (2022; Zbl 07759614) Full Text: DOI OA License
Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz Informative tests in signaling environments. (English) Zbl 07759611 Theor. Econ. 17, No. 3, 977-1006 (2022). MSC: 91A28 91A26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. Weksler} and \textit{B. Zik}, Theor. Econ. 17, No. 3, 977--1006 (2022; Zbl 07759611) Full Text: DOI OA License
Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes. (English) Zbl 07759595 Theor. Econ. 17, No. 2, 539-559 (2022). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{S. Gryglewicz} and \textit{A. Kolb}, Theor. Econ. 17, No. 2, 539--559 (2022; Zbl 07759595) Full Text: DOI OA License
Mekonnen, Teddy; Vizcaíno, René Leal Bayesian comparative statics. (English) Zbl 1489.91048 Theor. Econ. 17, No. 1, 219-251 (2022). MSC: 91A27 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Mekonnen} and \textit{R. L. Vizcaíno}, Theor. Econ. 17, No. 1, 219--251 (2022; Zbl 1489.91048) Full Text: DOI
Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi Relational communication. (English) Zbl 1485.91037 Theor. Econ. 16, No. 4, 1391-1430 (2021). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Kolotilin} and \textit{H. Li}, Theor. Econ. 16, No. 4, 1391--1430 (2021; Zbl 1485.91037) Full Text: DOI
Li, Fei; Norman, Peter Sequential persuasion. (English) Zbl 1475.91038 Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 639-675 (2021). MSC: 91A28 91A27 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{F. Li} and \textit{P. Norman}, Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 639--675 (2021; Zbl 1475.91038) Full Text: DOI
Jehiel, Philippe Communication with forgetful liars. (English) Zbl 1475.91036 Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 605-638 (2021). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Jehiel}, Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 605--638 (2021; Zbl 1475.91036) Full Text: DOI
Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi Delegating learning. (English) Zbl 1475.91032 Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 571-603 (2021). MSC: 91A26 91A28 91B43 91B03 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. F. Escobar} and \textit{Q. Zhang}, Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 571--603 (2021; Zbl 1475.91032) Full Text: DOI
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran Costly miscalibration. (English) Zbl 1475.91035 Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 477-506 (2021). MSC: 91A28 91A27 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{Y. Guo} and \textit{E. Shmaya}, Theor. Econ. 16, No. 2, 477--506 (2021; Zbl 1475.91035) Full Text: DOI
Li, Wei; Tan, Xu Locally Bayesian learning in networks. (English) Zbl 1445.91006 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 239-278 (2020). MSC: 91A26 91D30 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{W. Li} and \textit{X. Tan}, Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 239--278 (2020; Zbl 1445.91006) Full Text: DOI
Meyer, Margaret; De Barreda, Inés Moreno; Nafziger, Julia Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk. (English) Zbl 1448.91058 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 4, 1203-1235 (2019). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Meyer} et al., Theor. Econ. 14, No. 4, 1203--1235 (2019; Zbl 1448.91058) Full Text: DOI
Foerster, Manuel Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. (English) Zbl 1426.91188 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 1, 253-295 (2019). MSC: 91D30 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Foerster}, Theor. Econ. 14, No. 1, 253--295 (2019; Zbl 1426.91188) Full Text: DOI Link
Sobel, Joel Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games. (English) Zbl 1426.91015 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 1, 71-102 (2019). MSC: 91A10 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Sobel}, Theor. Econ. 14, No. 1, 71--102 (2019; Zbl 1426.91015) Full Text: DOI Link
Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay Communication and Cooperation in repeated games. (English) Zbl 1422.91090 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 2, 513-553 (2019). MSC: 91A20 91A28 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{Y. Awaya} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Theor. Econ. 14, No. 2, 513--553 (2019; Zbl 1422.91090) Full Text: DOI
Waki, Yuichiro; Dennis, Richard; Fujiwara, Ippei The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information. (English) Zbl 1419.91517 Theor. Econ. 13, No. 3, 1319-1367 (2018). MSC: 91B64 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{Y. Waki} et al., Theor. Econ. 13, No. 3, 1319--1367 (2018; Zbl 1419.91517) Full Text: DOI
Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin What kind of central bank competence? (English) Zbl 1396.91523 Theor. Econ. 13, No. 2, 697-727 (2018). MSC: 91B64 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Frankel} and \textit{N. Kartik}, Theor. Econ. 13, No. 2, 697--727 (2018; Zbl 1396.91523) Full Text: DOI
Kolotilin, Anton Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach. (English) Zbl 1396.91040 Theor. Econ. 13, No. 2, 607-635 (2018). MSC: 91A28 90C05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Kolotilin}, Theor. Econ. 13, No. 2, 607--635 (2018; Zbl 1396.91040) Full Text: DOI
Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring. (English) Zbl 1396.91027 Theor. Econ. 12, No. 2, 691-729 (2017). MSC: 91A20 91A05 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Sugaya} and \textit{A. Wolitzky}, Theor. Econ. 12, No. 2, 691--729 (2017; Zbl 1396.91027) Full Text: DOI
Suzuki, Toru Directives, expressives, and motivation. (English) Zbl 1396.91041 Theor. Econ. 12, No. 1, 175-210 (2017). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Suzuki}, Theor. Econ. 12, No. 1, 175--210 (2017; Zbl 1396.91041) Full Text: DOI
Chan, Jimmy H.; Zhang, Wenzhang Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals. (English) Zbl 1395.91042 Theor. Econ. 11, No. 1, 53-87 (2016). MSC: 91A20 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. H. Chan} and \textit{W. Zhang}, Theor. Econ. 11, No. 1, 53--87 (2016; Zbl 1395.91042) Full Text: DOI
Wolitzky, Alexander Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks. (English) Zbl 1395.91079 Theor. Econ. 10, No. 1, 67-101 (2015). MSC: 91A43 91A28 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Wolitzky}, Theor. Econ. 10, No. 1, 67--101 (2015; Zbl 1395.91079) Full Text: DOI
Chandrasekher, Madhav Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents. (English) Zbl 1395.91043 Theor. Econ. 10, No. 1, 11-49 (2015). MSC: 91A20 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Chandrasekher}, Theor. Econ. 10, No. 1, 11--49 (2015; Zbl 1395.91043) Full Text: DOI
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; de Martí, Joan; Prat, Andrea Communication and influence. (English) Zbl 1395.91064 Theor. Econ. 10, No. 2, 649-690 (2015). MSC: 91A28 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Calvó-Armengol} et al., Theor. Econ. 10, No. 2, 649--690 (2015; Zbl 1395.91064) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information. (English) Zbl 1395.91065 Theor. Econ. 9, No. 2, 483-513 (2014). MSC: 91A28 91A06 91F10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{Y. Chen} and \textit{H. Eraslan}, Theor. Econ. 9, No. 2, 483--513 (2014; Zbl 1395.91065) Full Text: DOI
Sher, Itai Persuasion and dynamic communication. (English) Zbl 1395.91069 Theor. Econ. 9, No. 1, 99-136 (2014). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{I. Sher}, Theor. Econ. 9, No. 1, 99--136 (2014; Zbl 1395.91069) Full Text: DOI
Ambrus, Attila; Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Kamada, Yuichiro Hierarchical cheap talk. (English) Zbl 1395.91063 Theor. Econ. 8, No. 1, 233-261 (2013). MSC: 91A28 91A65 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Ambrus} et al., Theor. Econ. 8, No. 1, 233--261 (2013; Zbl 1395.91063) Full Text: DOI
Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case. (English) Zbl 1395.91071 Theor. Econ. 8, No. 1, 95-123 (2013). MSC: 91A28 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Vida} and \textit{F. Forges}, Theor. Econ. 8, No. 1, 95--123 (2013; Zbl 1395.91071) Full Text: DOI
Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier Implementation with evidence. (English) Zbl 1397.91190 Theor. Econ. 7, No. 2, 323-355 (2012). MSC: 91B14 91A23 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{N. Kartik} and \textit{O. Tercieux}, Theor. Econ. 7, No. 2, 323--355 (2012; Zbl 1397.91190) Full Text: DOI
Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values. (English) Zbl 1395.91068 Theor. Econ. 7, No. 3, 465-488 (2012). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Mylovanov} and \textit{T. Tröger}, Theor. Econ. 7, No. 3, 465--488 (2012; Zbl 1395.91068) Full Text: DOI