Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions. (English) Zbl 1478.91028 Int. J. Game Theory 50, No. 4, 867-889 (2021). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. H. Schlag} and \textit{P. Vida}, Int. J. Game Theory 50, No. 4, 867--889 (2021; Zbl 1478.91028) Full Text: DOI
Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert; Wengström, Erik How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? (English) Zbl 1393.91029 Games Econ. Behav. 107, 153-181 (2018). MSC: 91A90 91A28 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Ellingsen} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 107, 153--181 (2018; Zbl 1393.91029) Full Text: DOI
Vida, Péter; Āzacis, Helmuts A detail-free mediator. (English) Zbl 1281.91041 Games Econ. Behav. 81, 101-115 (2013). MSC: 91A28 91A05 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Vida} and \textit{H. Āzacis}, Games Econ. Behav. 81, 101--115 (2013; Zbl 1281.91041) Full Text: DOI
Miettinen, Topi Promises and conventions – an approach to pre-play agreements. (English) Zbl 1281.91009 Games Econ. Behav. 80, 68-84 (2013). MSC: 91A05 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Miettinen}, Games Econ. Behav. 80, 68--84 (2013; Zbl 1281.91009) Full Text: DOI Link
Zultan, Ro’i Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach. (English) Zbl 1285.91020 Int. J. Game Theory 42, No. 4, 789-800 (2013). MSC: 91A28 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. Zultan}, Int. J. Game Theory 42, No. 4, 789--800 (2013; Zbl 1285.91020) Full Text: DOI Link
Miralles, Antonio Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry. (English) Zbl 1182.91085 Econ. Theory 42, No. 3, 523-538 (2010). MSC: 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Miralles}, Econ. Theory 42, No. 3, 523--538 (2010; Zbl 1182.91085) Full Text: DOI
Charness, Gary Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann’s conjecture. (English) Zbl 1028.91523 Games Econ. Behav. 33, No. 2, 177-194 (2000). MSC: 91A90 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{G. Charness}, Games Econ. Behav. 33, No. 2, 177--194 (2000; Zbl 1028.91523) Full Text: DOI
Bhaskar, V. Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation. (English) Zbl 0910.90271 J. Econ. Theory 82, No. 1, 110-131 (1998). MSC: 91A12 92D15 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{V. Bhaskar}, J. Econ. Theory 82, No. 1, 110--131 (1998; Zbl 0910.90271) Full Text: DOI
Blume, Andreas Communication, risk, and efficiency in games. (English) Zbl 0896.90180 Games Econ. Behav. 22, No. 2, 171-202 (1998). MSC: 91A05 91A10 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Blume}, Games Econ. Behav. 22, No. 2, 171--202 (1998; Zbl 0896.90180) Full Text: DOI Link
Kim, Yong-Gwan; Sobel, Joel An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication. (English) Zbl 0836.90147 Econometrica 63, No. 5, 1181-1193 (1995). MSC: 91A12 92D15 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{Y.-G. Kim} and \textit{J. Sobel}, Econometrica 63, No. 5, 1181--1193 (1995; Zbl 0836.90147) Full Text: DOI
Chakravorti, Bhaskar; Conley, John P. Cheap play with no regret. (English) Zbl 0831.90136 Int. J. Game Theory 24, No. 3, 223-237 (1995). MSC: 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{B. Chakravorti} and \textit{J. P. Conley}, Int. J. Game Theory 24, No. 3, 223--237 (1995; Zbl 0831.90136) Full Text: DOI
Chakravorti, Bhaskar Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication. (English) Zbl 0779.90019 J. Math. Econ. 22, No. 3, 265-294 (1993). MSC: 91B44 91A20 91B14 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{B. Chakravorti}, J. Math. Econ. 22, No. 3, 265--294 (1993; Zbl 0779.90019) Full Text: DOI Link
Gresik, Thomas A. Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade. (English) Zbl 0728.90025 J. Econ. Theory 53, No. 1, 131-145 (1991). Reviewer: Thomas A.Gresik MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. A. Gresik}, J. Econ. Theory 53, No. 1, 131--145 (1991; Zbl 0728.90025) Full Text: DOI
Watson, Joel Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games. (English) Zbl 0725.90102 Econ. Lett. 35, No. 3, 267-271 (1991). MSC: 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Watson}, Econ. Lett. 35, No. 3, 267--271 (1991; Zbl 0725.90102) Full Text: DOI
Palfrey, Thomas R.; Srivastava, Sanjay Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication. (English) Zbl 0743.90038 J. Econ. Theory 55, No. 1, 17-40 (1991). MSC: 91B26 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. R. Palfrey} and \textit{S. Srivastava}, J. Econ. Theory 55, No. 1, 17--40 (1991; Zbl 0743.90038) Full Text: DOI
d’Aspremont, C.; Gerard-Varet, L.-A. Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication. (English) Zbl 0448.90075 J. Econ. Theory 23, 201-217 (1980). MSC: 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{C. d'Aspremont} and \textit{L. A. Gerard-Varet}, J. Econ. Theory 23, 201--217 (1980; Zbl 0448.90075) Full Text: DOI