Fent, Thomas; Feichtinger, Gustav; Zalesak, Martin Optimal offending in view of the offender’s criminal record. (English) Zbl 0949.91009 CEJOR, Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 7, No. 2, 111-127 (1999). Summary: Gary S. Becker’s [J. Political Economy 76, 169-217 (1968)] economic approach to crime and punishment was essentially static. In the sequel M. L. Davis [J. Political Economy 96, 383-390 (1988)], J. Friedman, S. Hakim and U. Spiegel [Am. J. Econ. Soc. 48, 177-191 (1989)], J. Gerchak and M. Parlar [Optimal Control Appl. Methods 6, 305-312 (1985; Zbl 0571.92028)], S. F. Leung [J. Public Economics 45, 243-256 (1991)], and others addressed the question of optimal law enforcement by including intertemporal aspects. The present paper considers a rational offender who optimizes his/her criminal career by taking into consideration that the severity of the punishment for a given crime depends on the offender’s prior criminal record. A life cycle model for describing the behaviour of a recidivous criminal is formulated in terms of optimal control theory, the criminal’s record being the state variable. In particular, we study the impact of an offender’s prior criminal record on the punishment of a given crime. It should be stressed that such an analysis may yield important insight into the design of optimal law enforcement policies. A numerical phase-diagram analysis and, moreover, a sensitivity analysis are provided in order to show which strategies are expedient in reducing the amount of criminal activities and which make it even worse. Cited in 2 Documents MSC: 91B06 Decision theory 91B62 Economic growth models 93C95 Application models in control theory Keywords:economics of crime; optimal control; saddle point stability; sensitivity analysis; law enforcement; punishment policy Citations:Zbl 0571.92028 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Fent} et al., CEJOR, Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 7, No. 2, 111--127 (1999; Zbl 0949.91009)