Mennle, Timo; Seuken, Sven Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. (English) Zbl 07314460 J. Econ. Theory 191, Article ID 105144, 34 p. (2021). MSC: 91B32 91B03 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Mennle} and \textit{S. Seuken}, J. Econ. Theory 191, Article ID 105144, 34 p. (2021; Zbl 07314460) Full Text: DOI
Kaleta, Mariusz Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters. (English) Zbl 07311714 CEJOR, Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 28, No. 4, 1291-1314 (2020). MSC: 90B PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Kaleta}, CEJOR, Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 28, No. 4, 1291--1314 (2020; Zbl 07311714) Full Text: DOI
Lavi, Ron Mechanism design. (English) Zbl 07309873 Sotomayor, Marilda (ed.) et al., Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer (ISBN 978-1-0716-0367-3/print; 978-1-0716-0368-0/ebook; 978-1-0716-0369-7/print+ebook). Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series; Springer Reference, 317-333 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Lavi}, in: Complex social and behavioral systems. Game theory and agent-based models. New York, NY: Springer. 317--333 (2020; Zbl 07309873) Full Text: DOI
Nakamura, Yuta The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness. (English) Zbl 07297159 Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 3-4, 171-186 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Nakamura}, Rev. Econ. Des. 24, No. 3--4, 171--186 (2020; Zbl 07297159) Full Text: DOI
Li, Chunfa; Xie, Wenqian; Chu, Mingsen; Zhou, Chi Pricing and coordination mechanism design of dual-channel E-closed-loop supply chain dominated by e-commerce platform. (Chinese. English summary) Zbl 07295848 J. Syst. Sci. Math. Sci. 40, No. 6, 1090-1102 (2020). MSC: 91B24 91B03 90B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Li} et al., J. Syst. Sci. Math. Sci. 40, No. 6, 1090--1102 (2020; Zbl 07295848)
Mansour, Yishay; Slivkins, Aleksandrs; Syrgkanis, Vasilis Bayesian incentive-compatible bandit exploration. (English) Zbl 1451.90079 Oper. Res. 68, No. 4, 1132-1161 (2020). MSC: 90B50 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Mansour} et al., Oper. Res. 68, No. 4, 1132--1161 (2020; Zbl 1451.90079) Full Text: DOI
Sundararajan, Mukund; Yan, Qiqi Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. (English) Zbl 1452.91168 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 644-658 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Sundararajan} and \textit{Q. Yan}, Games Econ. Behav. 124, 644--658 (2020; Zbl 1452.91168) Full Text: DOI
Mackenzie, Andrew A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation. (English) Zbl 1452.91072 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 512-533 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91A18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Mackenzie}, Games Econ. Behav. 124, 512--533 (2020; Zbl 1452.91072) Full Text: DOI
Aziz, Haris; Chan, Hau; Lee, Barton E.; Parkes, David C. The capacity constrained facility location problem. (English) Zbl 1452.90199 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 478-490 (2020). MSC: 90B80 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Aziz} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 124, 478--490 (2020; Zbl 1452.90199) Full Text: DOI
Shafer, Rachel C. Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets. (English) Zbl 1452.91167 Games Econ. Behav. 124, 281-287 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. C. Shafer}, Games Econ. Behav. 124, 281--287 (2020; Zbl 1452.91167) Full Text: DOI
Sun, Jian; Xu, Dachuan; Han, Deren; Hou, Wenjing; Zhang, Xiaoyan Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling. (English) Zbl 07276051 Optim. Methods Softw. 35, No. 4, 722-740 (2020). MSC: 90B36 90B10 68M20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Sun} et al., Optim. Methods Softw. 35, No. 4, 722--740 (2020; Zbl 07276051) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yuan; Carman, Mark; Zhu, Ye; Xiang, Yong A technical survey on statistical modelling and design methods for crowdsourcing quality control. (English) Zbl 07274582 Artif. Intell. 287, Article ID 103351, 36 p. (2020). MSC: 68T PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., Artif. Intell. 287, Article ID 103351, 36 p. (2020; Zbl 07274582) Full Text: DOI
Babaioff, Moshe; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; Weinberg, S. Matthew A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. (English) Zbl 07273095 J. ACM 67, No. 4, Article No. 24, 40 p. (2020). MSC: 68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Babaioff} et al., J. ACM 67, No. 4, Article No. 24, 40 p. (2020; Zbl 07273095) Full Text: DOI
Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting. (English) Zbl 1452.91126 J. Econ. Theory 189, Article ID 105103, 31 p. (2020). MSC: 91B12 91B14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Gershkov} et al., J. Econ. Theory 189, Article ID 105103, 31 p. (2020; Zbl 1452.91126) Full Text: DOI
von Negenborn, Colin; Pollrich, Martin Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations. (English) Zbl 1452.91073 J. Econ. Theory 189, Article ID 105074, 25 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B44 91B43 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. von Negenborn} and \textit{M. Pollrich}, J. Econ. Theory 189, Article ID 105074, 25 p. (2020; Zbl 1452.91073) Full Text: DOI
Müller, Christoph Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies. (English) Zbl 07272915 J. Econ. Theory 189, Article ID 105038, 42 p. (2020). Reviewer: Annibal Parracho Sant’Anna (Rio de Janeiro) MSC: 91B14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Müller}, J. Econ. Theory 189, Article ID 105038, 42 p. (2020; Zbl 07272915) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Zhihuai; Fong, Ken C. K.; Li, Minming; Wang, Kai; Yuan, Hongning; Zhang, Yong Facility location games with optional preference. (English) Zbl 07270975 Theor. Comput. Sci. 847, 185-197 (2020). MSC: 68Q PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Chen} et al., Theor. Comput. Sci. 847, 185--197 (2020; Zbl 07270975) Full Text: DOI
Bhattacharya, Sayan; Koutsoupias, Elias; Kulkarni, Janardhan; Leonardi, Stefano; Roughgarden, Tim; Xu, Xiaoming Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders. (English) Zbl 07270960 Theor. Comput. Sci. 846, 160-171 (2020). MSC: 68Q PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bhattacharya} et al., Theor. Comput. Sci. 846, 160--171 (2020; Zbl 07270960) Full Text: DOI
Dogan, Mustafa; Uyanik, Metin Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers. (English) Zbl 1451.91075 Econ. Lett. 195, Article ID 109437, 6 p. (2020). MSC: 91B32 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Dogan} and \textit{M. Uyanik}, Econ. Lett. 195, Article ID 109437, 6 p. (2020; Zbl 1451.91075) Full Text: DOI
Liu, Bin; Liu, Dongri; Lu, Jingfeng Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007). (English) Zbl 1451.91033 Econ. Lett. 193, Article ID 109251, 5 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Liu} et al., Econ. Lett. 193, Article ID 109251, 5 p. (2020; Zbl 1451.91033) Full Text: DOI
Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. (English) Zbl 1448.91122 Games Econ. Behav. 123, 327-341 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 91A10 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Feldman} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 123, 327--341 (2020; Zbl 1448.91122) Full Text: DOI
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization. (English) Zbl 1451.91057 Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 871-904 (2020). MSC: 91B14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Lombardi} and \textit{N. Yoshihara}, Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 871--904 (2020; Zbl 1451.91057) Full Text: DOI
Juarez, Ruben; Nitta, Kohei; Vargas, Miguel Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation. (English) Zbl 1451.91079 Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 817-846 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Juarez} et al., Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 817--846 (2020; Zbl 1451.91079) Full Text: DOI
Klaus, Bettina; Nichifor, Alexandru Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices. (English) Zbl 07263727 Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 665-684 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Klaus} and \textit{A. Nichifor}, Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 665--684 (2020; Zbl 07263727) Full Text: DOI
Long, Yan Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects. (English) Zbl 1450.91018 Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 467-502 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Long}, Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 467--502 (2020; Zbl 1450.91018) Full Text: DOI
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig Strictly strategy-proof auctions. (English) Zbl 1450.91014 Math. Soc. Sci. 107, 13-16 (2020). Reviewer: Nikolay Kyurkchiev (Plovdiv) MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Escudé} and \textit{L. Sinander}, Math. Soc. Sci. 107, 13--16 (2020; Zbl 1450.91014) Full Text: DOI
Giuliodori, Paolo; Bistarelli, Stefano; Mugnai, Dimitri Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach. (English) Zbl 1448.91134 Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 88, No. 7, 793-816 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B03 91A12 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Giuliodori} et al., Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 88, No. 7, 793--816 (2020; Zbl 1448.91134) Full Text: DOI
Heumann, Tibor On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games. (English) Zbl 1448.91057 J. Math. Econ. 90, 109-118 (2020). MSC: 91A28 91A70 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Heumann}, J. Math. Econ. 90, 109--118 (2020; Zbl 1448.91057) Full Text: DOI
Cvitanić, J.; Prelec, D.; Radas, S.; Šikić, H. Incentive-compatible surveys via posterior probabilities. (English. Russian original) Zbl 1452.91070 Theory Probab. Appl. 65, No. 2, 292-321 (2020); translation from Teor. Veroyatn. Primen. 65, No. 2, 368-408 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Cvitanić} et al., Theory Probab. Appl. 65, No. 2, 292--321 (2020; Zbl 1452.91070); translation from Teor. Veroyatn. Primen. 65, No. 2, 368--408 (2020) Full Text: DOI
Kushnir, Alexey; Liu, Shuo On linear transformations of intersections. (English) Zbl 07243971 Set-Valued Var. Anal. 28, No. 3, 475-489 (2020). MSC: 52A20 52A35 91A99 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Kushnir} and \textit{S. Liu}, Set-Valued Var. Anal. 28, No. 3, 475--489 (2020; Zbl 07243971) Full Text: DOI
Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Tsumagari, Masatoshi Consulting collusive experts. (English) Zbl 1447.91037 Games Econ. Behav. 122, 290-317 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B43 91B41 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Mookherjee} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 122, 290--317 (2020; Zbl 1447.91037) Full Text: DOI
Utgoff, Naomi Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1447.91103 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105054, 22 p. (2020). MSC: 91B68 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Utgoff}, J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105054, 22 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91103) Full Text: DOI
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (English) Zbl 1447.91036 J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105036, 29 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B24 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kazumura} et al., J. Econ. Theory 188, Article ID 105036, 29 p. (2020; Zbl 1447.91036) Full Text: DOI
Baisa, Brian Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods. (English) Zbl 1444.91102 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 361-413 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Baisa}, Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 361--413 (2020; Zbl 1444.91102) Full Text: DOI
Heumann, Tibor Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint. (English) Zbl 1445.91027 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 319-359 (2020). MSC: 91B43 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Heumann}, Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 319--359 (2020; Zbl 1445.91027) Full Text: DOI
Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron Performance-maximizing large contests. (English) Zbl 1445.91013 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 57-88 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. Olszewski} and \textit{R. Siegel}, Theor. Econ. 15, No. 1, 57--88 (2020; Zbl 1445.91013) Full Text: DOI
Raghavan, Madhav Influence in private-goods allocation. (English) Zbl 1437.91238 J. Math. Econ. 89, 14-28 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Raghavan}, J. Math. Econ. 89, 14--28 (2020; Zbl 1437.91238) Full Text: DOI
Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans Information sharing in democratic mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1447.91035 Int. J. Game Theory 49, No. 2, 547-577 (2020). Reviewer: Annibal Parracho Sant’Anna (Rio de Janeiro) MSC: 91B03 91B12 91B18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Britz} and \textit{H. Gersbach}, Int. J. Game Theory 49, No. 2, 547--577 (2020; Zbl 1447.91035) Full Text: DOI
Paul, Arinjita; Suppakitpaisarn, Vorapong; Rangan, C. Pandu Smart contract-driven mechanism design to mitigate information diffusion in social networks. (English) Zbl 1452.91250 Pardalos, Panos (ed.) et al., Mathematical research for blockchain economy. Proceedings of the 1st international conference on mathematical research for blockchain economy, MARBLE 2019, Santorini, Greece, May 6–9, 2019. Cham: Springer. Springer Proc. Bus. Econ., 201-216 (2020). Reviewer: Yilun Shang (Newcastle) MSC: 91D30 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Paul} et al., in: Mathematical research for blockchain economy. Proceedings of the 1st international conference on mathematical research for blockchain economy, MARBLE 2019, Santorini, Greece, May 6--9, 2019. Cham: Springer. 201--216 (2020; Zbl 1452.91250) Full Text: DOI
Ersoy, Oğuzhan; Erkin, Zekeriya; Lagendijk, Reginald L. Decentralized incentive-compatible and Sybil-proof transaction advertisement. (English) Zbl 1446.68020 Pardalos, Panos (ed.) et al., Mathematical research for blockchain economy. Proceedings of the 1st international conference on mathematical research for blockchain economy, MARBLE 2019, Santorini, Greece, May 6–9, 2019. Cham: Springer. Springer Proc. Bus. Econ., 151-165 (2020). MSC: 68M12 91B03 94A60 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Ersoy} et al., in: Mathematical research for blockchain economy. Proceedings of the 1st international conference on mathematical research for blockchain economy, MARBLE 2019, Santorini, Greece, May 6--9, 2019. Cham: Springer. 151--165 (2020; Zbl 1446.68020) Full Text: DOI
Korman, Amos; Rodeh, Yoav Multi-round cooperative search games with multiple players. (English) Zbl 1451.91012 J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 113, 125-149 (2020). MSC: 91A14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Korman} and \textit{Y. Rodeh}, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 113, 125--149 (2020; Zbl 1451.91012) Full Text: DOI
Lan, Yanfei; Cai, Xiaoqiang; Shang, Changjing; Zhang, Lianmin; Zhao, Ruiqing Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information. (English) Zbl 1443.90100 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 286, No. 1, 149-163 (2020). MSC: 90B05 90B06 91B41 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Lan} et al., Eur. J. Oper. Res. 286, No. 1, 149--163 (2020; Zbl 1443.90100) Full Text: DOI
Amorós, Pablo Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition. (English) Zbl 1437.91174 Econ. Lett. 190, Article ID 109068, 3 p. (2020). MSC: 91B14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Amorós}, Econ. Lett. 190, Article ID 109068, 3 p. (2020; Zbl 1437.91174) Full Text: DOI
Wu, Yuanqing; Carricato, Marco Persistent manifolds of the special Euclidean group SE(3): a review. (English) Zbl 07200778 Comput. Aided Geom. Des. 79, Article ID 101872, 23 p. (2020). MSC: 65D PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Wu} and \textit{M. Carricato}, Comput. Aided Geom. Des. 79, Article ID 101872, 23 p. (2020; Zbl 07200778) Full Text: DOI
Yengin, Duygu; Chun, Youngsub No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem. (English) Zbl 1437.91242 J. Math. Econ. 88, 87-97 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B03 90B22 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Yengin} and \textit{Y. Chun}, J. Math. Econ. 88, 87--97 (2020; Zbl 1437.91242) Full Text: DOI
Ehlers, Lars; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; Sen, Arunava Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1437.91128 J. Math. Econ. 88, 31-41 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B14 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Ehlers} et al., J. Math. Econ. 88, 31--41 (2020; Zbl 1437.91128) Full Text: DOI
Du, Shaofu; Peng, Jing; Nie, Tengfei; Yu, Yugang Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding. (English) Zbl 1441.91020 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 284, No. 3, 951-966 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Du} et al., Eur. J. Oper. Res. 284, No. 3, 951--966 (2020; Zbl 1441.91020) Full Text: DOI
Correia-da-Silva, João Self-rejecting mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1437.91126 Games Econ. Behav. 120, 434-457 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B43 91B54 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Correia-da-Silva}, Games Econ. Behav. 120, 434--457 (2020; Zbl 1437.91126) Full Text: DOI
Chaturvedi, Rakesh Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly. (English) Zbl 1437.91231 Games Econ. Behav. 120, 325-335 (2020). MSC: 91B32 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Chaturvedi}, Games Econ. Behav. 120, 325--335 (2020; Zbl 1437.91231) Full Text: DOI
Yu, Jingsheng; Zhang, Jun A market design approach to job rotation. (English) Zbl 1437.91257 Games Econ. Behav. 120, 180-192 (2020). MSC: 91B39 91B03 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Yu} and \textit{J. Zhang}, Games Econ. Behav. 120, 180--192 (2020; Zbl 1437.91257) Full Text: DOI
Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M. A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism. (English) Zbl 1437.91223 Games Econ. Behav. 120, 1-15 (2020). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Loertscher} and \textit{L. M. Marx}, Games Econ. Behav. 120, 1--15 (2020; Zbl 1437.91223) Full Text: DOI
Devanur, Nikhil R.; Haghpanah, Nima; Psomas, Alexandros Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands. (English) Zbl 1437.91127 Games Econ. Behav. 121, 482-505 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. R. Devanur} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 121, 482--505 (2020; Zbl 1437.91127) Full Text: DOI
Krähmer, Daniel Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1437.91130 J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105020, 11 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Krähmer}, J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105020, 11 p. (2020; Zbl 1437.91130) Full Text: DOI
Aslam, Muhammad Shamrooz; Chen, Ziran Event-triggered reliable dissipative filtering for the delay nonlinear system under networked systems with the sensor fault. (English) Zbl 1440.93139 Int. J. Control 93, No. 3, 640-654 (2020). MSC: 93C42 93E11 93C65 93C43 93C10 93B70 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. S. Aslam} and \textit{Z. Chen}, Int. J. Control 93, No. 3, 640--654 (2020; Zbl 1440.93139) Full Text: DOI
Ma, Will; Sivan, Balasubramanian Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction. (English) Zbl 07186960 Oper. Res. Lett. 48, No. 2, 176-179 (2020). MSC: 90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. Ma} and \textit{B. Sivan}, Oper. Res. Lett. 48, No. 2, 176--179 (2020; Zbl 07186960) Full Text: DOI
Mackenzie, Andrew An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave. (English) Zbl 1435.91063 Econ. Theory 69, No. 3, 713-743 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Mackenzie}, Econ. Theory 69, No. 3, 713--743 (2020; Zbl 1435.91063) Full Text: DOI
Pram, Kym Weak implementation. (English) Zbl 1435.91085 Econ. Theory 69, No. 3, 569-594 (2020). MSC: 91B14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{K. Pram}, Econ. Theory 69, No. 3, 569--594 (2020; Zbl 1435.91085) Full Text: DOI
Kuryatnikova, Olga; Vera, Juan C. New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines. (English) Zbl 1434.68678 Theory Comput. Syst. 64, No. 2, 199-226 (2020). MSC: 68W25 68W20 90B35 90C47 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Kuryatnikova} and \textit{J. C. Vera}, Theory Comput. Syst. 64, No. 2, 199--226 (2020; Zbl 1434.68678) Full Text: DOI
Li, Yunan Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments. (English) Zbl 1432.91033 J. Econ. Theory 186, Article ID 105000, 54 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B43 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Li}, J. Econ. Theory 186, Article ID 105000, 54 p. (2020; Zbl 1432.91033) Full Text: DOI
Li, Linqiu; Liu, Ke Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model. (English) Zbl 1431.90007 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 283, No. 1, 380-389 (2020). MSC: 90B05 91B41 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Li} and \textit{K. Liu}, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 283, No. 1, 380--389 (2020; Zbl 1431.90007) Full Text: DOI
Troyan, Peter; Morrill, Thayer Obvious manipulations. (English) Zbl 1430.91030 J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104970, 26 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B32 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Troyan} and \textit{T. Morrill}, J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104970, 26 p. (2020; Zbl 1430.91030) Full Text: DOI
Bierbrauer, Felix; Winkelmann, Justus All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision. (English) Zbl 1430.91041 J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104955, 15 p. (2020). MSC: 91B18 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Bierbrauer} and \textit{J. Winkelmann}, J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104955, 15 p. (2020; Zbl 1430.91041) Full Text: DOI
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? (English) Zbl 1430.91029 J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104953, 19 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B14 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Korpela} et al., J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104953, 19 p. (2020; Zbl 1430.91029) Full Text: DOI
Lv, Hongtao; Wu, Fan; Luo, Tie; Gao, Xiaofeng; Chen, Guihai Hardness of and approximate mechanism design for the bike rebalancing problem. (English) Zbl 1443.91095 Theor. Comput. Sci. 803, 105-115 (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B26 68Q17 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Lv} et al., Theor. Comput. Sci. 803, 105--115 (2020; Zbl 1443.91095) Full Text: DOI
Zhao, Yuan; Yue, Wuyi Optimization of a probabilistic interruption mechanism for cognitive radio networks with prioritized secondary users. (English) Zbl 07313224 Pac. J. Optim. 15, No. 2, 207-218 (2019). MSC: 68M10 68M20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Zhao} and \textit{W. Yue}, Pac. J. Optim. 15, No. 2, 207--218 (2019; Zbl 07313224) Full Text: Link
Chen, Yiwei; Shi, Cong Joint pricing and inventory management with strategic customers. (English) Zbl 1444.90061 Oper. Res. 67, No. 6, 1610-1627 (2019). MSC: 90B50 90B05 90B06 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Chen} and \textit{C. Shi}, Oper. Res. 67, No. 6, 1610--1627 (2019; Zbl 1444.90061) Full Text: DOI
Balseiro, Santiago R.; Gurkan, Huseyin; Sun, Peng Multiagent mechanism design without money. (English) Zbl 07266017 Oper. Res. 67, No. 5, 1417-1436 (2019). MSC: 91B32 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. R. Balseiro} et al., Oper. Res. 67, No. 5, 1417--1436 (2019; Zbl 07266017) Full Text: DOI
Liu, Fang; Lewis, Tracy R.; Song, Jing-Sheng; Kuribko, Nataliya Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation. (English) Zbl 07265991 Oper. Res. 67, No. 4, 984-1001 (2019). MSC: 91B41 91B03 90B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Liu} et al., Oper. Res. 67, No. 4, 984--1001 (2019; Zbl 07265991) Full Text: DOI
Balseiro, Santiago R.; Besbes, Omar; Weintraub, Gabriel Y. Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment. (English) Zbl 07262454 Oper. Res. 67, No. 3, 711-730 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. R. Balseiro} et al., Oper. Res. 67, No. 3, 711--730 (2019; Zbl 07262454) Full Text: DOI
Grüner, Hans Peter; Tröger, Thomas Linear voting rules. (English) Zbl 1448.91102 Econometrica 87, No. 6, 2037-2077 (2019). MSC: 91B14 91B12 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. P. Grüner} and \textit{T. Tröger}, Econometrica 87, No. 6, 2037--2077 (2019; Zbl 1448.91102) Full Text: DOI Link
Börgers, Tilman; Li, Jiangtao Strategically simple mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1448.91073 Econometrica 87, No. 6, 2003-2035 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B60 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Börgers} and \textit{J. Li}, Econometrica 87, No. 6, 2003--2035 (2019; Zbl 1448.91073) Full Text: DOI Link
Carroll, Gabriel; Egorov, Georgy Strategic communication with minimal verification. (English) Zbl 1448.91074 Econometrica 87, No. 6, 1867-1892 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Carroll} and \textit{G. Egorov}, Econometrica 87, No. 6, 1867--1892 (2019; Zbl 1448.91074) Full Text: DOI Link
Silva, Francisco If we confess our sins. (English) Zbl 1444.91079 Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 3, 1389-1412 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B43 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Silva}, Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 3, 1389--1412 (2019; Zbl 1444.91079) Full Text: DOI Link
Markakis, Evangelos; Tsikiridis, Artem On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions. (English) Zbl 1435.91098 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 271-285 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Markakis} and \textit{A. Tsikiridis}, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 271--285 (2019; Zbl 1435.91098) Full Text: DOI
Kong, Yuqing; Peikert, Chris; Schoenebeck, Grant; Tao, Biaoshuai Outsourcing computation: the minimal refereed mechanism. (English) Zbl 1435.68100 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 256-270 (2019). MSC: 68Q09 68Q10 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Kong} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 256--270 (2019; Zbl 1435.68100) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Li, Weian; Qi, Qi On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions. (English) Zbl 1435.91097 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 228-240 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 228--240 (2019; Zbl 1435.91097) Full Text: DOI
Filos-Ratsikas, Aris; Giannakopoulos, Yiannis; Lazos, Philip The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1435.91061 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 186-199 (2019). MSC: 91B03 90B35 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Filos-Ratsikas} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 186--199 (2019; Zbl 1435.91061) Full Text: DOI
Ferraioli, Diodato; Meier, Adrian; Penna, Paolo; Ventre, Carmine Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains. (English) Zbl 1435.91060 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 171-185 (2019). MSC: 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Ferraioli} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 171--185 (2019; Zbl 1435.91060) Full Text: DOI
Dughmi, Shaddin; Niazadeh, Rad; Psomas, Alexandros; Weinberg, S. Matthew Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality. (English) Zbl 1435.91059 Caragiannis, Ioannis (ed.) et al., Web and Internet economics. 15th international conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10–12, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 142-155 (2019). MSC: 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Dughmi} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11920, 142--155 (2019; Zbl 1435.91059) Full Text: DOI
Grech, Philip D. Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions. (English) Zbl 1443.91093 Games 10, No. 2, Paper No. 21, 11 p. (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B18 91B08 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. D. Grech}, Games 10, No. 2, Paper No. 21, 11 p. (2019; Zbl 1443.91093) Full Text: DOI
La Mura, Pierfrancesco Contextual mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1443.91094 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 337-348 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. La Mura}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 337--348 (2019; Zbl 1443.91094) Full Text: DOI
Chiu, Jonathan; Koeppl, Thorsten Incentive compatibility on the blockchain. (English) Zbl 1443.91346 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 323-335 (2019). MSC: 91G99 91A80 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Chiu} and \textit{T. Koeppl}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 323--335 (2019; Zbl 1443.91346) Full Text: DOI
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case. (English) Zbl 1443.91106 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 295-306 (2019). MSC: 91B06 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Barberà} et al., in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 295--306 (2019; Zbl 1443.91106) Full Text: DOI
Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions. (English) Zbl 1443.91175 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 261-275 (2019). MSC: 91B32 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. H. Edelman} and \textit{J. A. Weymark}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 261--275 (2019; Zbl 1443.91175) Full Text: DOI
Dutta, Bhaskar Recent results on implementation with complete information. (English) Zbl 1443.91092 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 249-260 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B26 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Dutta}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 249--260 (2019; Zbl 1443.91092) Full Text: DOI
van Essen, Matthew; Walker, Mark Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium. (English) Zbl 1443.91098 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 205-215 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. van Essen} and \textit{M. Walker}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 205--215 (2019; Zbl 1443.91098) Full Text: DOI
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1443.91097 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 157-171 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Saijo}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 157--171 (2019; Zbl 1443.91097) Full Text: DOI
Ledyard, John O. Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement. (English) Zbl 1443.91169 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 139-156 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. O. Ledyard}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 139--156 (2019; Zbl 1443.91169) Full Text: DOI
Hurwicz, Leonid; Maskin, Eric; Postlewaite, Andrew Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments. (English) Zbl 1443.91132 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 99-137 (2019). MSC: 91B14 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Hurwicz} et al., in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 99--137 (2019; Zbl 1443.91132) Full Text: DOI
D’Aspremont, Claude; Crémer, Jacques Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1443.91091 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 85-98 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. D'Aspremont} and \textit{J. Crémer}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 85--98 (2019; Zbl 1443.91091) Full Text: DOI
Di, Lan; Yang, Zhe; Yuan, George Xianzhi The consensus games for consensus economics under the framework of blockchain in Fintech. (English) Zbl 1439.91006 Li, Deng-Feng (ed.), Game theory. Third East Asia game theory international conference, EAGT 2019, Fuzhou, Fujian, China, March 7–9, 2019. Revised selected papers. Singapore: Springer. Commun. Comput. Inf. Sci. 1082, 1-26 (2019). MSC: 91A12 91B03 91G99 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Di} et al., Commun. Comput. Inf. Sci. 1082, 1--26 (2019; Zbl 1439.91006) Full Text: DOI
Wang, Zhen; Zhu, Jinghua; Li, Doudou Prediction based reverse auction incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing system. (English) Zbl 1435.68055 Li, Yingshu (ed.) et al., Combinatorial optimization and applications. 13th international conference, COCOA 2019, Xiamen, China, December 13–15, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11949, 541-552 (2019). MSC: 68M18 90B80 90C27 91B03 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Wang} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11949, 541--552 (2019; Zbl 1435.68055) Full Text: DOI
da Silva, Gustavo Assis; Beck, André Teófilo; Sigmund, Ole Topology optimization of compliant mechanisms with stress constraints and manufacturing error robustness. (English) Zbl 1441.74156 Comput. Methods Appl. Mech. Eng. 354, 397-421 (2019). MSC: 74P15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. A. da Silva} et al., Comput. Methods Appl. Mech. Eng. 354, 397--421 (2019; Zbl 1441.74156) Full Text: DOI
Kruse, Thomas; Strack, Philipp An inverse optimal stopping problem for diffusion processes. (English) Zbl 1443.91199 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 2, 423-439 (2019). MSC: 91B43 60G40 60J60 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Kruse} and \textit{P. Strack}, Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 2, 423--439 (2019; Zbl 1443.91199) Full Text: DOI
Dütting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. (English) Zbl 1443.91165 Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 1, 196-211 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Dütting} et al., Math. Oper. Res. 44, No. 1, 196--211 (2019; Zbl 1443.91165) Full Text: DOI
Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking. (English) Zbl 1443.91347 Econ. Theory 68, No. 4, 967-1015 (2019). MSC: 91G99 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Grochulski} and \textit{Y. Zhang}, Econ. Theory 68, No. 4, 967--1015 (2019; Zbl 1443.91347) Full Text: DOI
Ye, Deshi; Xie, Feng; Zhang, Guochuan Truthful mechanism design of reversed auction on cloud computing. (English) Zbl 07172875 Du, Ding-Zhu (ed.) et al., Computing and combinatorics. 25th international conference, COCOON 2019, Xi’an, China, July 29–31, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-030-26175-7/pbk; 978-3-030-26176-4/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11653, 627-638 (2019). MSC: 68Rxx PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Ye} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11653, 627--638 (2019; Zbl 07172875) Full Text: DOI
Bayraktar, Erhan; Cvitanić, Jakša; Zhang, Yuchong Large tournament games. (English) Zbl 1443.91035 Ann. Appl. Probab. 29, No. 6, 3695-3744 (2019). Reviewer: Anna Jaskiewicz (Wrocław) MSC: 91A15 91A16 91A07 91A06 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Bayraktar} et al., Ann. Appl. Probab. 29, No. 6, 3695--3744 (2019; Zbl 1443.91035) Full Text: DOI Euclid
Chessa, Michela A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the wise man. (English) Zbl 07165843 Oper. Res. Lett. 47, No. 6, 560-564 (2019). MSC: 90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Chessa}, Oper. Res. Lett. 47, No. 6, 560--564 (2019; Zbl 07165843) Full Text: DOI
Caragiannis, Ioannis; Christodoulou, George; Protopapas, Nicos Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees. (English) Zbl 1431.91144 Fotakis, Dimitris (ed.) et al., Algorithmic game theory. 12th International symposium, SAGT 2019, Athens, Greece, September 30 – October 3, 2019. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11801, 269-283 (2019). MSC: 91B14 91B12 91B03 05C90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Caragiannis} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11801, 269--283 (2019; Zbl 1431.91144) Full Text: DOI Link