Thépot, Jacques Nash vs Stackelberg strategies in a capital accumulation game. (English) Zbl 0708.90102 Analysis and optimization of systems, Proc. 9th Int. Conf., Antibes/Fr. 1990, Lect. Notes Control Inf. Sci. 144, 735-744 (1990). [For the entire collection see Zbl 0699.00041.] The paper studies the so-called strategic capital accumulation game [see, e.g., D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, J. Econ. Theory 31, 227-250 (1983; Zbl 0521.90025)]. Under the assumptions of Fudenberg and Tirole the feedback Nash equilibrium and the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively, are qualitatively characterized. Reviewer: S.Jørgensen MSC: 91A23 Differential games (aspects of game theory) 91B62 Economic growth models Keywords:strategic capital accumulation game; feedback Nash equilibrium; open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium Citations:Zbl 0699.00041; Zbl 0521.90025 PDFBibTeX XML