Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent. (English) Zbl 1466.91157 Theor. Econ. 15, No. 2, 715-761 (2020). MSC: 91B41 91B43 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. Barron} et al., Theor. Econ. 15, No. 2, 715--761 (2020; Zbl 1466.91157) Full Text: DOI
Barron, Daniel Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection. (English) Zbl 1396.91025 Theor. Econ. 12, No. 3, 957-978 (2017). MSC: 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. Barron}, Theor. Econ. 12, No. 3, 957--978 (2017; Zbl 1396.91025) Full Text: DOI