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Parikh and Wittgenstein. (English) Zbl 1437.03002

Başkent, Can (ed.) et al., Rohit Parikh on logic, language and society. Cham: Springer. Outst. Contrib. Log. 11, 1-35 (2017).
Summary: A survey of Parikh’s philosophical appropriations of Wittgensteinian themes, placed into historical context against the backdrop of A. M. Turing’s famous paper [Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. (2) 42, 230–265 (1936; JFM 62.1059.03)] and its connections with Wittgenstein and the foundations of mathematics. Characterizing Parikh’s contributions to the interaction between logic and philosophy at its foundations, we argue that his work gives the lie to recent presentations of Wittgenstein’s so-called metaphilosophy (e.g., [P. Horwich, Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012)]) as a kind of “dead end” quietism. From early work on the idea of a feasibility in arithmetic [R. Parikh, J. Symb. Log. 36, 494–508 (1971; Zbl 0243.02037)] and vagueness [R. Parikh, in: Language, logic, and method. Dordrecht: Reidel. 241–261 (1983; Zbl 0502.03006)] to his more recent program in social software [R. Parikh, “Language as social software”, in: Future pasts. The analytic tradition in twentieth-century philosophy. Dedicated to Burton Dreben. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 339–350 (2001)], Parikh’s work encompasses and touches upon many foundational issues in epistemology, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, and value theory. But it expresses a unified philosophical point of view. In his most recent work, questions about public and private languages, opportunity spaces, strategic voting, non-monotonic inference and knowledge in literature provide a remarkable series of suggestions about how to present issues of fundamental importance in theoretical computer science as serious philosophical issues.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1381.03001].

MSC:

03-03 History of mathematical logic and foundations
03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
01A70 Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies

Biographic References:

Parikh, Rohit
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