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A survey of ranking theory. (English) Zbl 1384.03108

Arló-Costa, Horacio (ed.) et al., Readings in formal epistemology. Sourcebook. Edited with the assistance of Henrik Boensvang and Rasmus K. Rendsvig. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-319-20450-5/hbk; 978-3-319-20451-2/ebook). Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy 1, 303-347 (2016).
Summary: Epistemology is concerned with the fundamental laws of thought, belief, or judgment. It may inquire the fundamental relations among the objects or contents of thought and belief, i.e., among propositions or sentences. Then we enter the vast realm of formal logic. Or it may inquire the activity of judging or the attitude of believing itself. Often, we talk as if this would be a yes or no affair. From time immemorial, though, we know that judgment is firm or less than firm, that belief is a matter of degree. This insight opens another vast realm of formal epistemology.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1348.03005].

MSC:

03B42 Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03B48 Probability and inductive logic

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