Weibull, Jörgen W. On self-enforcement in extensive-form games. (English) Zbl 0764.90096 Games Econ. Behav. 4, No. 3, 450-462 (1992). MSC: 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. W. Weibull}, Games Econ. Behav. 4, No. 3, 450--462 (1992; Zbl 0764.90096) Full Text: DOI
Samuelson, Larry Dominated strategies and common knowledge. (English) Zbl 0749.90092 Games Econ. Behav. 4, No. 2, 284-313 (1992). MSC: 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{L. Samuelson}, Games Econ. Behav. 4, No. 2, 284--313 (1992; Zbl 0749.90092) Full Text: DOI
Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie; Geanakoplos, John Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures. (English) Zbl 0765.90091 Games Econ. Behav. 4, No. 2, 182-201 (1992). MSC: 91A10 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Brandenburger} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 4, No. 2, 182--201 (1992; Zbl 0765.90091) Full Text: DOI
Basu, Kaushik A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games. (English) Zbl 0771.90018 Econ. Lett. 40, No. 2, 187-191 (1992). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Basu}, Econ. Lett. 40, No. 2, 187--191 (1992; Zbl 0771.90018) Full Text: DOI
Glover, Jonathani Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints. (English) Zbl 0825.90040 Econ. Lett. 39, No. 2, 169-171 (1992). MSC: 91B14 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Glover}, Econ. Lett. 39, No. 2, 169--171 (1992; Zbl 0825.90040) Full Text: DOI
Samuelson, Larry Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games. (English) Zbl 0751.90089 Games Econ. Behav. 3, No. 1, 110-128 (1991). MSC: 91A05 92D15 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{L. Samuelson}, Games Econ. Behav. 3, No. 1, 110--128 (1991; Zbl 0751.90089) Full Text: DOI
Milgrom, Paul; Roberts, John Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games. (English) Zbl 0751.90093 Games Econ. Behav. 3, No. 1, 82-100 (1991). MSC: 91A10 91E40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Milgrom} and \textit{J. Roberts}, Games Econ. Behav. 3, No. 1, 82--100 (1991; Zbl 0751.90093) Full Text: DOI
van den Elzen, A. H.; Talman, A. J. J. A procedure for finding Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games. (English) Zbl 0729.90093 Z. Oper. Res. 35, No. 1, 27-43 (1991). Reviewer: J.K.Sobel (La Jolla) MSC: 91A05 90-08 91A10 90C33 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. H. van den Elzen} and \textit{A. J. J. Talman}, Z. Oper. Res. 35, No. 1, 27--43 (1991; Zbl 0729.90093) Full Text: DOI
Watson, Joel Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games. (English) Zbl 0725.90102 Econ. Lett. 35, No. 3, 267-271 (1991). MSC: 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Watson}, Econ. Lett. 35, No. 3, 267--271 (1991; Zbl 0725.90102) Full Text: DOI
Kaneko, Mamoru; Nagashima, Takashi Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities. (English) Zbl 0743.90120 Math. Soc. Sci. 22, No. 3, 229-255 (1991). MSC: 91A10 03B80 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Kaneko} and \textit{T. Nagashima}, Math. Soc. Sci. 22, No. 3, 229--255 (1991; Zbl 0743.90120) Full Text: DOI
Basu, Kaushik; Weibull, Jörgen W. Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior. (English) Zbl 0741.90097 Econ. Lett. 36, No. 2, 141-146 (1991). Reviewer: J.K.Sobel (La Jolla) MSC: 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Basu} and \textit{J. W. Weibull}, Econ. Lett. 36, No. 2, 141--146 (1991; Zbl 0741.90097) Full Text: DOI
Matsui, Akihiko Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society. (English) Zbl 0739.90078 J. Econ. Theory 54, No. 2, 245-258 (1991). Reviewer: F.Forges MSC: 91A10 91A05 91A20 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Matsui}, J. Econ. Theory 54, No. 2, 245--258 (1991; Zbl 0739.90078) Full Text: DOI
Sobel, Joel; Stole, Lars; Zapater, Iñigo Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games. (English) Zbl 0738.90092 J. Econ. Theory 52, No. 2, 304-331 (1990). MSC: 91A05 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Sobel} et al., J. Econ. Theory 52, No. 2, 304--331 (1990; Zbl 0738.90092) Full Text: DOI
Holler, Manfred J. The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem. (English) Zbl 1375.91008 Econ. Lett. 32, No. 4, 319-323 (1990). MSC: 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. J. Holler}, Econ. Lett. 32, No. 4, 319--323 (1990; Zbl 1375.91008) Full Text: DOI
Ben-Porath, Elchanan The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies. (English) Zbl 0753.90088 Games Econ. Behav. 2, No. 1, 1-12 (1990). MSC: 91A20 90C60 68Q45 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Ben-Porath}, Games Econ. Behav. 2, No. 1, 1--12 (1990; Zbl 0753.90088) Full Text: DOI
Lipman, Barton L.; Srivastava, Sanjay Computation as a correlation device. (English) Zbl 0754.90071 Games Econ. Behav. 2, No. 2, 154-172 (1990). MSC: 91A10 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{B. L. Lipman} and \textit{S. Srivastava}, Games Econ. Behav. 2, No. 2, 154--172 (1990; Zbl 0754.90071) Full Text: DOI
Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty. (English) Zbl 0721.90084 J. Econ. Theory 52, No. 2, 243-267 (1990). MSC: 91A10 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Dekel} and \textit{D. Fudenberg}, J. Econ. Theory 52, No. 2, 243--267 (1990; Zbl 0721.90084) Full Text: DOI
Chatterjee, K.; Samuelson, L. Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining. (English) Zbl 0718.90103 Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 3, 237-267 (1990). Reviewer: M.Le Breton (Marseille) MSC: 91A12 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Chatterjee} and \textit{L. Samuelson}, Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 3, 237--267 (1990; Zbl 0718.90103) Full Text: DOI
McAllister, Patrick H. Rational behavior and rational expectations. (English) Zbl 0716.90006 J. Econ. Theory 52, No. 2, 332-363 (1990). MSC: 91B50 91B16 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. H. McAllister}, J. Econ. Theory 52, No. 2, 332--363 (1990; Zbl 0716.90006) Full Text: DOI
Rabin, Matthew Communication between rational agents. (English) Zbl 0709.90107 J. Econ. Theory 51, No. 1, 144-170 (1990). Reviewer: T.S.H.Driessen MSC: 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Rabin}, J. Econ. Theory 51, No. 1, 144--170 (1990; Zbl 0709.90107) Full Text: DOI
Basu, K. On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games. (English) Zbl 0708.90093 Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 1, 33-44 (1990). Reviewer: J.K.Sobel MSC: 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Basu}, Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 1, 33--44 (1990; Zbl 0708.90093) Full Text: DOI
Nachbar, J. H. “Evolutionary” selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties. (English) Zbl 0699.90109 Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 1, 59-89 (1990). Reviewer: J.H.Nachbar MSC: 91A40 92D25 93A10 92B05 91A12 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. H. Nachbar}, Int. J. Game Theory 19, No. 1, 59--89 (1990; Zbl 0699.90109) Full Text: DOI
Nau, Robert F.; McCardle, Kevin F. Coherent behavior in noncooperative games. (English) Zbl 0694.90100 J. Econ. Theory 50, No. 2, 424-444 (1990). MSC: 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. F. Nau} and \textit{K. F. McCardle}, J. Econ. Theory 50, No. 2, 424--444 (1990; Zbl 0694.90100) Full Text: DOI
Crawford, Vincent P. Equilibrium without independence. (English) Zbl 0689.90075 J. Econ. Theory 50, No. 1, 127-154 (1990). MSC: 91A05 91B06 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{V. P. Crawford}, J. Econ. Theory 50, No. 1, 127--154 (1990; Zbl 0689.90075) Full Text: DOI
van Damme, Eric Stable equilibria and forward induction. (English) Zbl 0675.90099 J. Econ. Theory 48, No. 2, 476-496 (1989). MSC: 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. van Damme}, J. Econ. Theory 48, No. 2, 476--496 (1989; Zbl 0675.90099) Full Text: DOI Link
Gilboa, Itzhak; Schmeidler, David Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge? (English) Zbl 1328.91013 Econ. Lett. 27, No. 3, 215-221 (1988). MSC: 91A10 91A40 94A99 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{I. Gilboa} and \textit{D. Schmeidler}, Econ. Lett. 27, No. 3, 215--221 (1988; Zbl 1328.91013) Full Text: DOI
Farrell, Joseph Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium. (English) Zbl 1328.91034 Econ. Lett. 27, No. 3, 209-214 (1988); errata ibid. 33, No. 3, 299-300 (1990). MSC: 91A28 91A05 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Farrell}, Econ. Lett. 27, No. 3, 209--214 (1988; Zbl 1328.91034) Full Text: DOI
Basu, Kaushik Strategic irrationality in extensive games. (English) Zbl 0658.90110 Math. Soc. Sci. 15, No. 3, 247-260 (1988). Reviewer: M.Nermuth MSC: 91A99 91E99 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Basu}, Math. Soc. Sci. 15, No. 3, 247--260 (1988; Zbl 0658.90110) Full Text: DOI
Benoit, Jean-Pierre A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma. (English) Zbl 0654.90108 Math. Soc. Sci. 16, No. 3, 281-287 (1988). MSC: 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J.-P. Benoit}, Math. Soc. Sci. 16, No. 3, 281--287 (1988; Zbl 0654.90108) Full Text: DOI
Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu; Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, Sérgio The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games. (English) Zbl 0653.90098 J. Econ. Theory 45, No. 2, 370-391 (1988). MSC: 91A10 62C10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. C. C. Tan} and \textit{S. Ribeiro da Costa Werlang}, J. Econ. Theory 45, No. 2, 370--391 (1988; Zbl 0653.90098) Full Text: DOI Link
Knuth, Donald E.; Papadimitriou, Christos H.; Tsitsiklis, John N. A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games. (English) Zbl 0643.90100 Oper. Res. Lett. 7, No. 3, 103-107 (1988). MSC: 91A05 91A10 68Q25 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. E. Knuth} et al., Oper. Res. Lett. 7, No. 3, 103--107 (1988; Zbl 0643.90100) Full Text: DOI
Harrington, Joseph E. jun. Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. (English) Zbl 1328.91033 Econ. Lett. 23, No. 3, 233-237 (1987). MSC: 91A26 91A20 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. E. Harrington jun.}, Econ. Lett. 23, No. 3, 233--237 (1987; Zbl 1328.91033) Full Text: DOI
Basu, Kaushik Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination. (English) Zbl 1328.91026 Econ. Lett. 23, No. 2, 147-151 (1987). MSC: 91A20 91A05 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Basu}, Econ. Lett. 23, No. 2, 147--151 (1987; Zbl 1328.91026) Full Text: DOI
Madrigal, Vicente; Tan, Tommy C. C.; Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, Sérgio Support restrictions and sequential equilibria. (English) Zbl 0627.90102 J. Econ. Theory 43, 329-334 (1987). MSC: 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{V. Madrigal} et al., J. Econ. Theory 43, 329--334 (1987; Zbl 0627.90102) Full Text: DOI
Myerson, R. B. Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria. (English) Zbl 0619.90095 Int. J. Game Theory 15, 133-154 (1986). MSC: 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. B. Myerson}, Int. J. Game Theory 15, 133--154 (1986; Zbl 0619.90095) Full Text: DOI
Wagner, R. Harrison A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game. (English) Zbl 0617.90093 Theory Decis. 21, 311-335 (1986). MSC: 91A12 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. H. Wagner}, Theory Decis. 21, 311--335 (1986; Zbl 0617.90093) Full Text: DOI
Bryant, John An example of a dominance approach to rational expectations. (English) Zbl 1273.91123 Econ. Lett. 16, No. 3-4, 249-255 (1984). MSC: 91B08 91B14 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Bryant}, Econ. Lett. 16, No. 3--4, 249--255 (1984; Zbl 1273.91123) Full Text: DOI