Zhang, Yang; Chen, Ying-Ju Optimal nonlinear pricing in social networks under asymmetric network information. (English) Zbl 1455.91111 Oper. Res. 68, No. 3, 818-833 (2020). Reviewer: Yilun Shang (Newcastle) MSC: 91B24 91D30 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Zhang} and \textit{Y.-J. Chen}, Oper. Res. 68, No. 3, 818--833 (2020; Zbl 1455.91111) Full Text: DOI
Jin, Yaonan; Lu, Pinyan; Tang, Zhihao Gavin; Xiao, Tao Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms. (English) Zbl 07248600 SIAM J. Comput. 49, No. 5, 927-958 (2020). MSC: 65K05 68W40 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Jin} et al., SIAM J. Comput. 49, No. 5, 927--958 (2020; Zbl 07248600) Full Text: DOI
Chillemi, Ottorino; Galavotti, Stefano; Gui, Benedetto Optimal contracts with contingent allocation. (English) Zbl 1442.91054 Econ. Lett. 192, Article ID 109202, 3 p. (2020). MSC: 91B41 91B32 91B43 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Chillemi} et al., Econ. Lett. 192, Article ID 109202, 3 p. (2020; Zbl 1442.91054) Full Text: DOI
Danau, Daniel; Vinella, Annalisa A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability. (English) Zbl 1434.91039 Int. J. Game Theory 49, No. 1, 47-74 (2020). MSC: 91B43 91B41 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Danau} and \textit{A. Vinella}, Int. J. Game Theory 49, No. 1, 47--74 (2020; Zbl 1434.91039) Full Text: DOI
Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M. Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions. (English) Zbl 1437.91222 J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105030, 34 p. (2020). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Loertscher} and \textit{L. M. Marx}, J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105030, 34 p. (2020; Zbl 1437.91222) Full Text: DOI
Krähmer, Daniel Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1437.91130 J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105020, 11 p. (2020). MSC: 91B03 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Krähmer}, J. Econ. Theory 187, Article ID 105020, 11 p. (2020; Zbl 1437.91130) Full Text: DOI
Bierbrauer, Felix; Winkelmann, Justus All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision. (English) Zbl 1430.91041 J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104955, 15 p. (2020). MSC: 91B18 91B03 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Bierbrauer} and \textit{J. Winkelmann}, J. Econ. Theory 185, Article ID 104955, 15 p. (2020; Zbl 1430.91041) Full Text: DOI
D’Aspremont, Claude; Crémer, Jacques Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1443.91091 Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 85-98 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. D'Aspremont} and \textit{J. Crémer}, in: Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. 85--98 (2019; Zbl 1443.91091) Full Text: DOI
Farhadi, Farzaneh; Tavafoghi, Hamidreza; Teneketzis, Demosthenis; Golestani, S. Jamaloddin An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents. (English) Zbl 1431.91089 Dyn. Games Appl. 9, No. 4, 914-941 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B32 91A25 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Farhadi} et al., Dyn. Games Appl. 9, No. 4, 914--941 (2019; Zbl 1431.91089) Full Text: DOI
Ellman, Matthew; Hurkens, Sjaak Optimal crowdfunding design. (English) Zbl 1426.91295 J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104939, 36 p. (2019). MSC: 91G50 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Ellman} and \textit{S. Hurkens}, J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104939, 36 p. (2019; Zbl 1426.91295) Full Text: DOI
Laohakunakorn, Krittanai; Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation. (English) Zbl 1426.91137 J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104932, 55 p. (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{K. Laohakunakorn} et al., J. Econ. Theory 184, Article ID 104932, 55 p. (2019; Zbl 1426.91137) Full Text: DOI
Guo, Huiyi Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces. (English) Zbl 07104173 J. Econ. Theory 183, 76-105 (2019). MSC: 91B03 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Guo}, J. Econ. Theory 183, 76--105 (2019; Zbl 07104173) Full Text: DOI
Peck, James; Rampal, Jeevant Non-optimality of state by state monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty: an example. (English) Zbl 1420.91099 Econ. Lett. 183, Article ID 108561, 3 p. (2019). MSC: 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Peck} and \textit{J. Rampal}, Econ. Lett. 183, Article ID 108561, 3 p. (2019; Zbl 1420.91099) Full Text: DOI
Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay Communication and Cooperation in repeated games. (English) Zbl 1422.91090 Theor. Econ. 14, No. 2, 513-553 (2019). MSC: 91A20 91A28 91A12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Awaya} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Theor. Econ. 14, No. 2, 513--553 (2019; Zbl 1422.91090) Full Text: DOI
Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments. (English) Zbl 1417.91243 J. Math. Econ. 82, 214-226 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. M. Manelli} and \textit{D. R. Vincent}, J. Math. Econ. 82, 214--226 (2019; Zbl 1417.91243) Full Text: DOI
de Martí, Joan; Milán, Pau Regime change in large information networks. (English) Zbl 1419.91134 Games Econ. Behav. 113, 262-284 (2019). MSC: 91A28 91A10 91A43 90B10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. de Martí} and \textit{P. Milán}, Games Econ. Behav. 113, 262--284 (2019; Zbl 1419.91134) Full Text: DOI
Song, Yangwei Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents. (English) Zbl 1419.91400 J. Econ. Theory 176, 693-726 (2018). MSC: 91B32 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Song}, J. Econ. Theory 176, 693--726 (2018; Zbl 1419.91400) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Yi-Chun; Li, Jiangtao Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1417.91128 J. Econ. Theory 178, 294-317 (2018). MSC: 91A40 91B14 90C05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y.-C. Chen} and \textit{J. Li}, J. Econ. Theory 178, 294--317 (2018; Zbl 1417.91128) Full Text: DOI
Safronov, Mikhail Coalition-proof full efficient implementation. (English) Zbl 1417.91196 J. Econ. Theory 177, 659-677 (2018). MSC: 91B14 91A12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Safronov}, J. Econ. Theory 177, 659--677 (2018; Zbl 1417.91196) Full Text: DOI
Koska, Onur A.; Onur, Ilke; Stähler, Frank The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. (English) Zbl 1417.91242 J. Econ. 125, No. 2, 107-136 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. A. Koska} et al., J. Econ. 125, No. 2, 107--136 (2018; Zbl 1417.91242) Full Text: DOI
Arozamena, Leandro; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions. (English) Zbl 1397.91239 Econ. Lett. 171, 115-118 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Arozamena} et al., Econ. Lett. 171, 115--118 (2018; Zbl 1397.91239) Full Text: DOI
Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan; Figueroa, Nicolás Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide. (English) Zbl 1396.91142 Math. Soc. Sci. 91, 56-61 (2018). MSC: 91B14 91B26 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Caffera} et al., Math. Soc. Sci. 91, 56--61 (2018; Zbl 1396.91142) Full Text: DOI
Di Corato, Luca; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts. (English) Zbl 1403.91166 Eur. J. Oper. Res. 267, No. 1, 368-380 (2018). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Di Corato} et al., Eur. J. Oper. Res. 267, No. 1, 368--380 (2018; Zbl 1403.91166) Full Text: DOI
Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Ruqu; Zhang, Jun Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes. (English) Zbl 1422.91390 J. Econ. Theory 175, 291-317 (2018). MSC: 91B32 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{B. Liu} et al., J. Econ. Theory 175, 291--317 (2018; Zbl 1422.91390) Full Text: DOI
Gradwohl, Ronen Privacy in implementation. (English) Zbl 1392.91055 Soc. Choice Welfare 50, No. 3, 547-580 (2018). MSC: 91B14 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Gradwohl}, Soc. Choice Welfare 50, No. 3, 547--580 (2018; Zbl 1392.91055) Full Text: DOI
Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Piacentino, Giorgia Contracting to compete for flows. (English) Zbl 1400.91538 J. Econ. Theory 173, 289-319 (2018). MSC: 91G10 91B24 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. R. Donaldson} and \textit{G. Piacentino}, J. Econ. Theory 173, 289--319 (2018; Zbl 1400.91538) Full Text: DOI
Meng, Dawen; Tian, Guoqiang; Yang, Zhe Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage. (English) Zbl 1422.91270 Rev. Econ. Des. 21, No. 3, 177-229 (2017). MSC: 91B24 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Meng} et al., Rev. Econ. Des. 21, No. 3, 177--229 (2017; Zbl 1422.91270) Full Text: DOI
Börgers, Tilman (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007). (English) Zbl 1422.91295 Rev. Econ. Des. 21, No. 2, 73-82 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Börgers}, Rev. Econ. Des. 21, No. 2, 73--82 (2017; Zbl 1422.91295) Full Text: DOI
Ungureanu, Sergiu Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information. (English) Zbl 1415.91186 Int. J. Game Theory 46, No. 3, 667-692 (2017). MSC: 91B40 91A25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Ungureanu}, Int. J. Game Theory 46, No. 3, 667--692 (2017; Zbl 1415.91186) Full Text: DOI
Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. (English) Zbl 1414.91151 J. Econ. Theory 172, 313-347 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Hart} and \textit{N. Nisan}, J. Econ. Theory 172, 313--347 (2017; Zbl 1414.91151) Full Text: DOI
Loertscher, Simon; Muir, Ellen V.; Taylor, Peter G. A general non-central hypergeometric distribution. (English) Zbl 1422.62071 Commun. Stat., Theory Methods 46, No. 9, 4579-4598 (2017). MSC: 62E15 62D05 62G30 60E05 62P20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Loertscher} et al., Commun. Stat., Theory Methods 46, No. 9, 4579--4598 (2017; Zbl 1422.62071) Full Text: DOI
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces. (English) Zbl 1400.91218 J. Econ. Theory 170, 385-416 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Gizatulina} and \textit{M. Hellwig}, J. Econ. Theory 170, 385--416 (2017; Zbl 1400.91218) Full Text: DOI
Kuzmics, Christoph; Steg, Jan-Henrik On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget. (English) Zbl 1400.91184 J. Econ. Theory 170, 56-69 (2017). MSC: 91B18 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Kuzmics} and \textit{J.-H. Steg}, J. Econ. Theory 170, 56--69 (2017; Zbl 1400.91184) Full Text: DOI
Li, Yunan Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values. (English) Zbl 1393.91088 Games Econ. Behav. 103, 225-253 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Li}, Games Econ. Behav. 103, 225--253 (2017; Zbl 1393.91088) Full Text: DOI
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Obara, Ichiro Mechanism design with information acquisition. (English) Zbl 1404.91038 Econ. Theory 63, No. 3, 783-812 (2017). MSC: 91A40 91B44 62F15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bikhchandani} and \textit{I. Obara}, Econ. Theory 63, No. 3, 783--812 (2017; Zbl 1404.91038) Full Text: DOI
Krajbich, Ian; Camerer, Colin; Rangel, Antonio Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1393.91087 Games Econ. Behav. 101, 49-62 (2017). MSC: 91B26 91A90 91B18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Krajbich} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 101, 49--62 (2017; Zbl 1393.91087) Full Text: DOI
Alon, Noga; Feldman, Moran; Tennenholtz, Moshe Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction. (English) Zbl 1358.91055 Algorithmica 77, No. 1, 1-15 (2017). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. Alon} et al., Algorithmica 77, No. 1, 1--15 (2017; Zbl 1358.91055) Full Text: DOI
Kong, Yuqing; Ligett, Katrina; Schoenebeck, Grant Putting peer prediction under the micro(economic)scope and making truth-telling focal. (English) Zbl 1406.91237 Cai, Yang (ed.) et al., Web and internet economics. 12th international conference, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, December 11–14, 2016. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-662-54109-8/pbk; 978-3-662-54110-4/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10123, 251-264 (2016). MSC: 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Kong} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 10123, 251--264 (2016; Zbl 1406.91237) Full Text: DOI
Liu, Tingjun Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders. (English) Zbl 1371.91069 J. Econ. Theory 166, 94-123 (2016). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Liu}, J. Econ. Theory 166, 94--123 (2016; Zbl 1371.91069) Full Text: DOI
Cadsby, C. Bram; Du, Ninghua; Wang, Ruqu; Zhang, Jun Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions. (English) Zbl 1394.91156 Games Econ. Behav. 99, 224-238 (2016). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. B. Cadsby} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 99, 224--238 (2016; Zbl 1394.91156) Full Text: DOI
He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations. (English) Zbl 1347.91156 Games Econ. Behav. 97, 166-173 (2016). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. He} and \textit{J. Li}, Games Econ. Behav. 97, 166--173 (2016; Zbl 1347.91156) Full Text: DOI
Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning. (English) Zbl 1347.91177 Games Econ. Behav. 96, 145-169 (2016). MSC: 91B38 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Gomes} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 96, 145--169 (2016; Zbl 1347.91177) Full Text: DOI
Kushnir, Alexey On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types. (English) Zbl 1364.91065 Econ. Lett. 133, 4-6 (2015). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Kushnir}, Econ. Lett. 133, 4--6 (2015; Zbl 1364.91065) Full Text: DOI
Adamczyk, Marek; Borodin, Allan; Ferraioli, Diodato; de Keijzer, Bart; Leonardi, Stefano Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations. (English) Zbl 1406.91138 Markakis, Evangelos (ed.) et al., Web and internet economics. 11th international conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9–12, 2015. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-662-48994-9/pbk; 978-3-662-48995-6/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9470, 1-15 (2015). MSC: 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Adamczyk} et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 9470, 1--15 (2015; Zbl 1406.91138) Full Text: DOI
Papadimitriou, Christos; Pierrakos, George Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors. (English) Zbl 1318.91102 Games Econ. Behav. 92, 430-454 (2015). MSC: 91B26 68Q25 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Papadimitriou} and \textit{G. Pierrakos}, Games Econ. Behav. 92, 430--454 (2015; Zbl 1318.91102) Full Text: DOI
Pancs, Romans Efficient dark markets. (English) Zbl 1356.91053 Econ. Theory 59, No. 3, 605-624 (2015). MSC: 91B26 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Pancs}, Econ. Theory 59, No. 3, 605--624 (2015; Zbl 1356.91053) Full Text: DOI
Shimoji, Makoto; Schweinzer, Paul Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners. (English) Zbl 1318.91034 Games Econ. Behav. 91, 258-267 (2015). MSC: 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Shimoji} and \textit{P. Schweinzer}, Games Econ. Behav. 91, 258--267 (2015; Zbl 1318.91034) Full Text: DOI
Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kaklamanis, Christos; Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis; Kyropoulou, Maria; Lucier, Brendan; Paes Leme, Renato; Tardos, Éva Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions. (English) Zbl 1314.91114 J. Econ. Theory 156, 343-388 (2015). MSC: 91B26 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Caragiannis} et al., J. Econ. Theory 156, 343--388 (2015; Zbl 1314.91114) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs. (English) Zbl 1314.91115 J. Econ. Theory 156, 77-102 (2015). MSC: 91B26 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Chen} and \textit{S. Micali}, J. Econ. Theory 156, 77--102 (2015; Zbl 1314.91115) Full Text: DOI
Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Williams, Steven R.; Zachariadis, Konstantinos E. Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions. (English) Zbl 1296.91131 Games Econ. Behav. 86, 248-263 (2014). MSC: 91B26 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. A. Satterthwaite} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 86, 248--263 (2014; Zbl 1296.91131) Full Text: DOI
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs. (English) Zbl 1296.91126 J. Math. Econ. 51, 136-153 (2014). MSC: 91B26 91B44 28A33 60B10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Gizatulina} and \textit{M. Hellwig}, J. Math. Econ. 51, 136--153 (2014; Zbl 1296.91126) Full Text: DOI
Pancs, Romans Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition. (English) Zbl 1283.91080 Games Econ. Behav. 82, 522-543 (2013). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Pancs}, Games Econ. Behav. 82, 522--543 (2013; Zbl 1283.91080) Full Text: DOI
Csapó, Gergely; Müller, Rudolf Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good. (English) Zbl 1281.91073 Games Econ. Behav. 80, 229-242 (2013). MSC: 91B18 90B05 90C05 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Csapó} and \textit{R. Müller}, Games Econ. Behav. 80, 229--242 (2013; Zbl 1281.91073) Full Text: DOI
Piccolo, Salvatore; Pagnozzi, Marco Information sharing between vertical hierarchies. (English) Zbl 1281.91115 Games Econ. Behav. 79, 201-222 (2013). MSC: 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Piccolo} and \textit{M. Pagnozzi}, Games Econ. Behav. 79, 201--222 (2013; Zbl 1281.91115) Full Text: DOI
Farinha Luz, Vitor Surplus extraction with rich type spaces. (English) Zbl 1284.91172 J. Econ. Theory 148, No. 6, 2749-2762 (2013). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Farinha Luz}, J. Econ. Theory 148, No. 6, 2749--2762 (2013; Zbl 1284.91172) Full Text: DOI
Mares, Vlad; Shor, Mikhael Information concentration in common value environments. (English) Zbl 1273.91219 Rev. Econ. Des. 17, No. 3, 183-203 (2013). MSC: 91B26 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Mares} and \textit{M. Shor}, Rev. Econ. Des. 17, No. 3, 183--203 (2013; Zbl 1273.91219) Full Text: DOI
Ju, Yuan Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players. (English) Zbl 1269.91040 Int. J. Game Theory 42, No. 2, 501-520 (2013). MSC: 91B26 91B06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Ju}, Int. J. Game Theory 42, No. 2, 501--520 (2013; Zbl 1269.91040) Full Text: DOI
Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny Locally robust implementation and its limits. (English) Zbl 1276.91080 J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 6, 2439-2452 (2012). Reviewer: Tamás Mátrai (Budapest) MSC: 91B69 91B08 91B14 91B44 91B54 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Jehiel} et al., J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 6, 2439--2452 (2012; Zbl 1276.91080) Full Text: DOI
Bandi, Michael Martin Chaithanya; Bertsimas, Dimitris Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization. (English) Zbl 1263.90001 Math. Program. 134, No. 1 (B), 23-70 (2012). MSC: 90-02 90B22 91B70 49K45 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. M. C. Bandi} and \textit{D. Bertsimas}, Math. Program. 134, No. 1 (B), 23--70 (2012; Zbl 1263.90001) Full Text: DOI
Chari, V. V.; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations. (English) Zbl 1258.91170 J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 2, 781-801 (2012). MSC: 91B74 91B26 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. V. Chari} et al., J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 2, 781--801 (2012; Zbl 1258.91170) Full Text: DOI
Krähmer, Daniel Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types. (English) Zbl 1258.91087 J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 1, 118-141 (2012). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Krähmer}, J. Econ. Theory 147, No. 1, 118--141 (2012; Zbl 1258.91087) Full Text: DOI
Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland Comment on “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]. (English) Zbl 1255.91226 J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 5, 2159-2164 (2011). MSC: 91B44 91A12 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Krähmer} and \textit{R. Strausz}, J. Econ. Theory 146, No. 5, 2159--2164 (2011; Zbl 1255.91226) Full Text: DOI
Galavotti, Stefano; Muto, Nozomu; Oyama, Daisuke On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality. (English) Zbl 1233.91128 Econ. Theory 48, No. 1, 87-123 (2011). Reviewer: E. Ahmed (Mansoura) MSC: 91B26 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Galavotti} et al., Econ. Theory 48, No. 1, 87--123 (2011; Zbl 1233.91128) Full Text: DOI
Skreta, Vasiliki On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure. (English) Zbl 1208.91057 Rev. Econ. Des. 15, No. 1, 1-36 (2011). MSC: 91B26 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Skreta}, Rev. Econ. Des. 15, No. 1, 1--36 (2011; Zbl 1208.91057) Full Text: DOI
Bikhchandani, Sushil Information acquisition and full surplus extraction. (English) Zbl 1203.91136 J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 6, 2282-2308 (2010). MSC: 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bikhchandani}, J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 6, 2282--2308 (2010; Zbl 1203.91136) Full Text: DOI
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents. (English) Zbl 1203.91083 J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 6, 2260-2281 (2010). MSC: 91B18 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Gizatulina} and \textit{M. Hellwig}, J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 6, 2260--2281 (2010; Zbl 1203.91083) Full Text: DOI
Matsushima, Hitoshi; Miyazaki, Koichi; Yagi, Nobuyuki Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information. (English) Zbl 1203.91070 J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 6, 2241-2259 (2010). MSC: 91B14 91B40 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Matsushima} et al., J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 6, 2241--2259 (2010; Zbl 1203.91070) Full Text: DOI
Hagedorn, Marcus The value of information for auctioneers. (English) Zbl 1195.91056 J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 5, 2197-2208 (2009). MSC: 91B26 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Hagedorn}, J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 5, 2197--2208 (2009; Zbl 1195.91056) Full Text: DOI
Bose, Subir; Daripa, Arup A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity. (English) Zbl 1195.91050 J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 5, 2084-2114 (2009). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bose} and \textit{A. Daripa}, J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 5, 2084--2114 (2009; Zbl 1195.91050) Full Text: DOI
Fadel, Ronald; Segal, Ilya The communication cost of selfishness. (English) Zbl 1195.91074 J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 5, 1895-1920 (2009). MSC: 91B32 91A80 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. Fadel} and \textit{I. Segal}, J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 5, 1895--1920 (2009; Zbl 1195.91074) Full Text: DOI
Fey, Mark; Ramsay, Kristopher W. Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types. (English) Zbl 1195.91052 Rev. Econ. Des. 13, No. 3, 233-250 (2009). MSC: 91B26 91F10 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Fey} and \textit{K. W. Ramsay}, Rev. Econ. Des. 13, No. 3, 233--250 (2009; Zbl 1195.91052) Full Text: DOI
Börgers, Tilman; Norman, Peter A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types. (English) Zbl 1159.91374 Econ. Theory 39, No. 3, 477-489 (2009). MSC: 91B26 91B06 91B16 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{T. Börgers} and \textit{P. Norman}, Econ. Theory 39, No. 3, 477--489 (2009; Zbl 1159.91374) Full Text: DOI
Gershkov, Alex; Szentes, Balázs Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition. (English) Zbl 1154.91378 J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 1, 36-68 (2009). MSC: 91B12 91B44 91B14 91B06 91B08 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Gershkov} and \textit{B. Szentes}, J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 1, 36--68 (2009; Zbl 1154.91378) Full Text: DOI
Cella, Michela Informed principal with correlation. (English) Zbl 1152.91372 Games Econ. Behav. 64, No. 2, 433-456 (2008). MSC: 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Cella}, Games Econ. Behav. 64, No. 2, 433--456 (2008; Zbl 1152.91372) Full Text: DOI
Severinov, Sergei An efficient solution to the informed principal problem. (English) Zbl 1140.91442 J. Econ. Theory 141, No. 1, 114-133 (2008). MSC: 91B50 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Severinov}, J. Econ. Theory 141, No. 1, 114--133 (2008; Zbl 1140.91442) Full Text: DOI
Kosenok, Grigory; Severinov, Sergei Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus. (English) Zbl 1136.91498 J. Econ. Theory 140, No. 1, 126-161 (2008). MSC: 91B32 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Kosenok} and \textit{S. Severinov}, J. Econ. Theory 140, No. 1, 126--161 (2008; Zbl 1136.91498) Full Text: DOI
Bergemann, Dirk; Pesendorfer, Martin Information structures in optimal auctions. (English) Zbl 1132.91441 J. Econ. Theory 137, No. 1, 580-609 (2007). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Bergemann} and \textit{M. Pesendorfer}, J. Econ. Theory 137, No. 1, 580--609 (2007; Zbl 1132.91441) Full Text: DOI
Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies. (English) Zbl 1136.91515 Rev. Econ. Des. 11, No. 3, 185-198 (2007). MSC: 91B54 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. O. Jackson} and \textit{I. Kremer}, Rev. Econ. Des. 11, No. 3, 185--198 (2007; Zbl 1136.91515) Full Text: DOI
Miller, Nolan H.; Pratt, John W.; Zeckhauser, Richard J.; Johnson, Scott Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations. (English) Zbl 1281.91093 J. Econ. Theory 136, No. 1, 476-496 (2007). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{N. H. Miller} et al., J. Econ. Theory 136, No. 1, 476--496 (2007; Zbl 1281.91093) Full Text: DOI
Weinstein, Jonathan; Yildiz, Muhamet Impact of higher-order uncertainty. (English) Zbl 1155.91306 Games Econ. Behav. 60, No. 1, 200-212 (2007). MSC: 91A10 91A44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Weinstein} and \textit{M. Yildiz}, Games Econ. Behav. 60, No. 1, 200--212 (2007; Zbl 1155.91306) Full Text: DOI
Kadan, Ohad Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values. (English) Zbl 1186.91109 J. Econ. Theory 135, No. 1, 495-513 (2007). MSC: 91B26 91A05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{O. Kadan}, J. Econ. Theory 135, No. 1, 495--513 (2007; Zbl 1186.91109) Full Text: DOI
Bose, Subir; Zhao, Jinhua Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible. (English) Zbl 1186.91045 J. Econ. Theory 135, No. 1, 357-381 (2007). MSC: 91A28 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Bose} and \textit{J. Zhao}, J. Econ. Theory 135, No. 1, 357--381 (2007; Zbl 1186.91045) Full Text: DOI
Mares, Vlad; Harstad, Ronald M. Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly. (English) Zbl 1122.91033 Econ. Theory 32, No. 2, 399-410 (2007). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Mares} and \textit{R. M. Harstad}, Econ. Theory 32, No. 2, 399--410 (2007; Zbl 1122.91033) Full Text: DOI
Ledyard, John O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments. (English) Zbl 1280.91068 J. Econ. Theory 133, No. 1, 441-466 (2007). MSC: 91B18 91B32 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. O. Ledyard} and \textit{T. R. Palfrey}, J. Econ. Theory 133, No. 1, 441--466 (2007; Zbl 1280.91068) Full Text: DOI
Matsushima, Hitoshi Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance. (English) Zbl 1280.91086 J. Econ. Theory 133, No. 1, 1-30 (2007). MSC: 91B26 91B14 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{H. Matsushima}, J. Econ. Theory 133, No. 1, 1--30 (2007; Zbl 1280.91086) Full Text: DOI
Mezzetti, Claudio Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction. (English) Zbl 1114.91043 Econ. Theory 31, No. 3, 473-488 (2007). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Mezzetti}, Econ. Theory 31, No. 3, 473--488 (2007; Zbl 1114.91043) Full Text: DOI
Crémer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles Z. Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types. (English) Zbl 1254.91209 Econ. Lett. 93, No. 1, 94-100 (2006). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Crémer} et al., Econ. Lett. 93, No. 1, 94--100 (2006; Zbl 1254.91209) Full Text: DOI
Baron, David P.; Meirowitz, Adam Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models. (English) Zbl 1102.91022 Soc. Choice Welfare 26, No. 3, 455-470 (2006). MSC: 91A28 91A18 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. P. Baron} and \textit{A. Meirowitz}, Soc. Choice Welfare 26, No. 3, 455--470 (2006; Zbl 1102.91022) Full Text: DOI
Menicucci, Domenico Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments. (English) Zbl 1152.91471 Math. Soc. Sci. 51, No. 3, 280-300 (2006). MSC: 91B26 91B30 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Menicucci}, Math. Soc. Sci. 51, No. 3, 280--300 (2006; Zbl 1152.91471) Full Text: DOI
Faure-Grimaud, A.; Reiche, S. Dynamic yardstick mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1125.91377 Games Econ. Behav. 54, No. 2, 316-335 (2006). MSC: 91B40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Faure-Grimaud} and \textit{S. Reiche}, Games Econ. Behav. 54, No. 2, 316--335 (2006; Zbl 1125.91377) Full Text: DOI
Eső, Péter An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion. (English) Zbl 1117.91026 J. Econ. Theory 125, No. 1, 78-89 (2005). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Eső}, J. Econ. Theory 125, No. 1, 78--89 (2005; Zbl 1117.91026) Full Text: DOI
Parreiras, Sérgio O. Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents. (English) Zbl 1114.91078 J. Econ. Theory 123, No. 2, 210-217 (2005). MSC: 91B44 91A12 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. O. Parreiras}, J. Econ. Theory 123, No. 2, 210--217 (2005; Zbl 1114.91078) Full Text: DOI
Olszewski, Wojciech Informal communication. (English) Zbl 1181.91042 J. Econ. Theory 117, No. 2, 180-200 (2004). MSC: 91A28 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. Olszewski}, J. Econ. Theory 117, No. 2, 180--200 (2004; Zbl 1181.91042) Full Text: DOI
d’Aspremont, Claude; Crémer, Jacques; Gérard-Varet, Louis-André Balanced Bayesian mechanisms. (English) Zbl 1073.91047 J. Econ. Theory 115, No. 2, 385-396 (2004). MSC: 91B32 62C10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. d'Aspremont} et al., J. Econ. Theory 115, No. 2, 385--396 (2004; Zbl 1073.91047) Full Text: DOI
Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller’s revenue. (English) Zbl 1086.91024 J. Math. Econ. 40, No. 3-4, 371-392 (2004). Reviewer: Malgorzata Doman (Poznań) MSC: 91B26 91B32 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. O. Jackson} and \textit{I. Kremer}, J. Math. Econ. 40, No. 3--4, 371--392 (2004; Zbl 1086.91024) Full Text: DOI
Neeman, Zvika The relevance of private information in mechanism design. (English) Zbl 1094.91038 J. Econ. Theory 117, No. 1, 55-77 (2004). MSC: 91B44 91B18 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Z. Neeman}, J. Econ. Theory 117, No. 1, 55--77 (2004; Zbl 1094.91038) Full Text: DOI
Forges, Françoise The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game. (English) Zbl 1076.91028 Math. Soc. Sci. 47, No. 2, 135-151 (2004). MSC: 91B68 91A12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Forges}, Math. Soc. Sci. 47, No. 2, 135--151 (2004; Zbl 1076.91028) Full Text: DOI
Kargin, Vladislav Prevention of herding by experts. (English) Zbl 1254.91057 Econ. Lett. 78, No. 3, 401-407 (2003). MSC: 91A40 91A28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Kargin}, Econ. Lett. 78, No. 3, 401--407 (2003; Zbl 1254.91057) Full Text: DOI
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. (English) Zbl 1064.91055 Games Econ. Behav. 45, No. 2, 410-433 (2003). Reviewer: Vangelis Grigoroudis (Chania) MSC: 91B44 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{R. P. McLean} and \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Games Econ. Behav. 45, No. 2, 410--433 (2003; Zbl 1064.91055) Full Text: DOI
Krishna, Vijay Asymmetric English auctions. (English) Zbl 1085.91023 J. Econ. Theory 112, No. 2, 261-288 (2003). Reviewer: Ernst G. Al’brekht (Ekaterinburg) MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{V. Krishna}, J. Econ. Theory 112, No. 2, 261--288 (2003; Zbl 1085.91023) Full Text: DOI