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The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior. (English) Zbl 07736290

Summary: In this study, the effects of labor subsidy, taxation, and corruption mechanism on individual behavior are examined within the context of the public goods game. A specific focus is placed on the investigation of how individuals can obtain labor subsidies through the implementation of reward and punishment strategies based on taxation. The findings reveal that a moderate labor subsidy value fosters stable alliances between cooperators and executors, effectively excluding defectors, and this system remains robust under high tax levels. Additionally, it is noted that only the incentive provided by the reward mechanism can facilitate the invasion of defectors. Intuitively, the presence of a corruption mechanism exerts minimal influence on the average level of individual behavior when executors receive increased labor subsidies.

MSC:

91Axx Game theory
91Bxx Mathematical economics
92Dxx Genetics and population dynamics
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