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Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. (English) Zbl 1330.91102
Summary: This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately implementable.

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B14 Social choice
60J20 Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.)
91A25 Dynamic games
91A20 Multistage and repeated games
Full Text: DOI
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