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Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory. (English) Zbl 1127.91004

Summary: We introduce best response dynamics for settings where agents’ preferences are diverse. Under these dynamics, which are defined on the space of Bayesian strategies, rest points and Bayesian equilibria are identical. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solution trajectories to these dynamics, and provide methods of analyzing the dynamics based on aggregation.

MSC:

91A10 Noncooperative games
91A22 Evolutionary games
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