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Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard. (English) Zbl 1010.91058

Summary: This paper studies collective economic organizations that share risk and mitigate moral hazard and compares them with relative performance contracts. Information-constrained optimal distributions of organizations and contracts are shown to be functions of the underlying primitives, in particular, the distribution of Pareto weights, and hence degree of inequality. Internal inequality of a potential, local group is a force for collective organization. That is, multi-agent organizations exist in order to extract wealth from some but not necessarily all members. The group organization is also shown to be information-constrained Pareto optimal at extremes of local wealth relative to an outsider. But the group organization is susceptible to both agents simultaneously deviating, colluding against the outsider, and this distortion makes an individualistic, relative performance contract an attractive alternative. More generally, organizations, contracts, and allocations are jointly determined. These implications could be distinguished in cross-sectional, time series data.

MSC:

91B40 Labor market, contracts (MSC2010)
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