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Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: An application to the Spanish electricity market. (English) Zbl 1141.91013

Let \(G\) be an electricity market game. \(G\) corresponds to a continuous electricty auction with bounded variation rate functions representing bids to supply electricity. The main mathematical result is to show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium on \(G\). When specifics of the Spanish electricity market are imposed upon \(G\), one gets a stronger result: the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A10 Noncooperative games
91B76 Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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