Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values. (English) Zbl 07787041 Games Econ. Behav. 143, 51-76 (2024). MSC: 91A28 91A27 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{Y. Heller} and \textit{C. Kuzmics}, Games Econ. Behav. 143, 51--76 (2024; Zbl 07787041) Full Text: DOI arXiv
Diehl, Christoph; Kuzmics, Christoph The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent. (English) Zbl 1475.91034 Int. J. Game Theory 50, No. 4, 911-925 (2021). MSC: 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{C. Diehl} and \textit{C. Kuzmics}, Int. J. Game Theory 50, No. 4, 911--925 (2021; Zbl 1475.91034) Full Text: DOI
Kuzmics, Christoph; Rodenburger, Daniel A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory. (English) Zbl 1451.91053 Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 685-721 (2020). MSC: 91B12 91A22 91A90 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{C. Kuzmics} and \textit{D. Rodenburger}, Econ. Theory 70, No. 3, 685--721 (2020; Zbl 1451.91053) Full Text: DOI
Kuzmics, Christoph On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations. (English) Zbl 1217.91017 Games Econ. Behav. 72, No. 2, 452-466 (2011). MSC: 91A22 91A26 91A06 91A15 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{C. Kuzmics}, Games Econ. Behav. 72, No. 2, 452--466 (2011; Zbl 1217.91017) Full Text: DOI Link
Kuzmics, Christoph Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information. (English) Zbl 1093.91008 Games Econ. Behav. 48, No. 2, 321-336 (2004). MSC: 91A18 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{C. Kuzmics}, Games Econ. Behav. 48, No. 2, 321--336 (2004; Zbl 1093.91008) Full Text: DOI