×

Conflict, private and communal property. (English) Zbl 1348.91231

Summary: This paper develops a model where agents can create private property rights on a resource by making appropriative activities. We show that the value of the resource has a non-monotonic effect on the emergence of private property. When the resource is sufficiently valuable, agents have an incentive to leave a sharing agreement and private property can appear. However if the value of the resource increases beyond a given threshold, deviations from the sharing agreement leads to a very costly confrontation. In this case, private property is not sustainable. Our analysis also finds that population size has an important effect on the size of the parameter set in which private property is sustainable.

MSC:

91B99 Mathematical economics
91A12 Cooperative games
PDFBibTeX XMLCite
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] A. Alchian, The property rights paradigm,, Journal of Economic History, 33, 16 (1973) · doi:10.1017/S0022050700076403
[2] A. Bogomolnaia, The stability of hedonic coalition structures,, Games and Economic Behavior, 38, 201 (2002) · Zbl 1013.91011 · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0877
[3] F. Bloch, Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff Division,, Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 90 (1996) · Zbl 0862.90143 · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0043
[4] F. Bloch, <em>Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts</em>,, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (ed. M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas) (2011) · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0020
[5] M. S. Y. Chwe, Farsighted coalition stability,, Journal of Economic Theory, 63, 299 (1994) · Zbl 0841.90131 · doi:10.1006/jeth.1994.1044
[6] D. de Meza, The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights,, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 561 (1992)
[7] H. Demsetz, Towards a theory of property rights,, Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, 3, 163 (2000) · doi:10.1057/9780230523210_9
[8] M. Garfinkel, Economics of conflict: An overview,, in Handbook of Defense Economics (ed. T. Sandler and K. Hartley) (2007) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.895307
[9] H. Grossman, The Creation of effective property rights,, American Economic Review, 91, 347 (2001) · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.347
[10] S. Hart, Endogenous formation of coalitions,, Econometrica, 51, 1047 (1983) · Zbl 0523.90097 · doi:10.2307/1912051
[11] T. Miceli, <em>Property Law,</em>, in Handbook of Law and Economics (ed. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell) (2007)
[12] R. Posner, Economic analysis of the law,, Stanford Law Review, 26 (1974) · doi:10.2307/1227682
[13] D. Ray, A theory of endogenous coalition structures,, Games and Economic Behavior, 26, 286 (1999) · Zbl 0918.90146 · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0648
[14] D. Ray, Farsighted stable set,, Econometrica, 83, 977 (2015) · Zbl 1419.91051 · doi:10.3982/ECTA12022
[15] S. Sanchez-Pages, On the social efficiency of conflict,, Economics Letters, 90, 96 (2006) · Zbl 1254.91058 · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.011
[16] S. Sanchez-Pages, Rivalry, exclusion and coalitions,, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9, 809 (2007) · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00333.x
[17] S. Skaperdas, Cooperation and conflict in the absence of property rights,, American Economic Review, 82, 720 (1992)
[18] S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions,, Economic Theory, 7, 283 (1996) · Zbl 0852.90137 · doi:10.1007/BF01213906
[19] J. Umbeck, Might makes rights: A theory of the foundation and initial distribution of property rights,, Economic Inquiry, 19, 38 (1981) · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00602.x
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.