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Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets. (English) Zbl 1209.91075
Summary: We present experimental data on a simple market game. Several solution concepts from cooperative game theory are applied to predict the observed payoff distributions. Notably, a recently introduced solution concept meant to capture the influence of outside options on the payoff distribution within groups fares better than most other solution concepts under consideration. Our results shed some light on the effects of scarcity relations on markets on bargaining outcomes within negotiating dyads.

MSC:
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A12 Cooperative games
91A90 Experimental studies
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