×

Incorporating dominant environment into individual fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoners’ dilemma game. (English) Zbl 1375.91027

Summary: In spatial evolutionary games, the fitness of each player is usually measured by its inheritance (i.e. the accumulated payoffs by playing the game with its all nearest neighbors), or by the linear combination of its inheritance and its environment (i.e. the average of its all nearest neighbors’ inheritance). However, a rational individual incorporates environment into its fitness to develop itself only when environment is dominant in real life. Here, we redefine the individual fitness as a linear combination of inheritance and environment when environment performs better than inheritance. Multiple Monte Carlo simulation results show that incorporating dominant environment can improve cooperation comparing with the traditional case, and furthermore increasing the proportion of prevailing environment can enhance cooperative level better. These findings indicate that our mechanism enhances the individual ability to adapt environment, and makes the spatial reciprocity more efficient. Besides, we also verify its robustness against different game models and various topology structures.

MSC:

91A22 Evolutionary games
PDFBibTeX XMLCite
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Colman, A., Game theory and its application (1995), Butterworth-Heinemann: Butterworth-Heinemann Oxford
[2] Doebeli, M.; Hauert, C., Models of cooperation based on prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift game, Ecol Lett, 8, 748-766 (2005)
[3] Darwin, C., The origin of species (1958), Harvard University Press: Harvard University Press Cambridge, (Reprinted,1964)
[4] Smith, JM, Evolution and the theory of games (1982), Cambridge University Press: Cambridge University Press Cambridge · Zbl 0526.90102
[5] Ren, J.; Wu, J.; Wang, WX; Cheng, G.; Wang, BH, Interplay between evolutionary game and network structure: the coevolution of social net, cooperation and wealth distribution, Physics, 66, Article 0605250 pp. (2006), Eprint Arxiv
[6] Moyano, LG; Sánchez, A., Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma, J Theor Biol, 259, 1, 84-95 (2009) · Zbl 1402.91052
[7] Hauert, C.; Doebeli, M., Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game, Nature, 428, 643-646 (2004)
[8] Sysi-Aho, M.; Saramäki, J.; Kertész, J.; Kaski, K., Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents, Euro Phys J B, 44, 129-135 (2005)
[9] Hamilton, WD, Genetical evolution of social behavior I & II, J Theor Biol, 7, 1-52 (1964)
[10] Axelrod, R.; Hamilton, WD, The evolution of cooperation, Science, 211, 1390-1396 (1981) · Zbl 1225.92037
[11] Boccaletti, S.; Latora, V.; Moreno, Y.; Chavez, M.; Hwang, D., Complex networks: structure and dynamics, Phys Rep, 424, 175-308 (2006) · Zbl 1371.82002
[12] Nowak, MA; Sigmund, K., Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring, Nature, 393, 573-577 (1998)
[13] Reeves, EB; Pitts, TC, Cooperative strategies in low-noise environments, Am Sociol Rev, 61, 338 (1996)
[14] Assaf, M.; Mobilia, M.; Roberts, E., Cooperation dilemma in finite populations under fluctuating environments, Phys Rev Lett, 111, Article 238101 pp. (2013)
[15] Szolnoki, A.; Vukov, J.; Szabó, G., Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas, Phys Rev E, 80, Article 056112 pp. (2009)
[16] Nowak, MA, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation, Science, 314, 1560-1563 (2006)
[17] Szolnoki, A.; Szabo, G., Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games, Europhys Lett, 77, 30004 (2007)
[18] Perc, M.; Szolnoki, A., Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, Phys Rev E, 77, Article 011904 pp. (2008) · Zbl 1189.91034
[19] Shen, C.; Lu, J.; Shi, L., Does coevolution setup promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game?, Appl Math Comput, 290, 201-207 (2016) · Zbl 1410.91083
[20] Zhang, GQ; Hu, TP; Yu, Z., An improved fitness evaluation mechanism with noise in prisoner’s dilemma game, Appl Math Comput, 276, 31-36 (2016) · Zbl 1410.91087
[21] Szolnoki, A.; Vukov, J.; Szabó, G., Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas, Phys Rev E, 80, Article 056112 pp. (2009)
[22] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game, Europhys Lett, 3, 92, 38003 (2010)
[23] Wang, Z.; Wang, L.; Yin, ZY; Xia, CY, Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games, PLoS One, 7, e40218 (2012)
[24] Fu, F.; Hauert, C.; Nowak, MA; Wang, L., Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks, Phys Rev E, 78, Article 026117 pp. (2008)
[25] Santos, FC; Santos, MD; Pacheco, JM, Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games, Nature, 454, 213-216 (2008)
[26] Perc, M.; Szolnoki, A., Coevolutionary games—a mini review, BioSystems, 99, 109 (2010)
[27] Szabó, G.; Fáth, G., Evolutionary games on graphs, Phys Rep, 446, 97 (2007)
[28] Wang, WX; Ren, J.; Chen, G.; Wang, BH, Memory-based snowdrift game on networks, Phys Rev E, 74, Article 056113 pp. (2006)
[29] Wu, ZX; Xu, XJ; Chen, Y.; Wang, YH, Spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with volunteering in Newman-Watts small-world networks, Phys Rev E, 71, Article 037103 pp. (2005)
[30] Du, WB; Cao, XB; Yang, HX; Hu, MB, Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on Newman-Watts social networks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism, Chin Phys B, 19, Article 010204 pp. (2010)
[31] Wang, Z.; Du, WB; Cao, XB; Zhang, LZ, Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, Phys A Stat Mech Appl, 390, 1234-1239 (2011)
[32] Wang, Z.; Murks, A.; Du, WB; Rong, ZH; Perc, M., Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas, J Theor Biol, 277, 19-26 (2011) · Zbl 1405.91045
[33] Wang, Z.; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation, Sci Rep, 2, 16 (2012), srep00369
[34] Szabó, G.; Tő ke, C., Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice, Phys Rev E, 58, 69-73 (1998)
[35] Nowak, MA; May, RM, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos, Nature, 359, 826-829 (1992)
[36] Hauert, C.; Doebeli, M., Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game, Nature, 428, 6983, 643-646 (2004)
[37] Doebeli, M.; Hauert, C.; Killingback, T., The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors, Science, 306, 859 (2004)
[38] Szabó, G.; Vukov, J.; Szolnoki, A., Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices, Phys Rev E, 72, Article 047107 pp. (2005)
[39] Wang, Z.; Perc, M., Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game, Phys Rev E, 82, Article 021115 pp. (2010)
[40] Szolnoki, A.; Szabó, G., Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma games, Europhys Lett, 77, 30004 (2007)
[41] Traulsen, A.; Nowak, MA; Pacheco, JM, Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection, J Theor Biol., 244, 349 (2007) · Zbl 1450.91006
[42] Ren, J.; Wang, WX; Qi, F., Randomness enhances cooperation: coherence resonance in evolutionary game, Phys Rev E, 75, Article 045101(R) pp. (2007)
[43] Vukov, J.; Szabó, G.; Szolnoki, A., Cooperation in the noisy case: prisoner’s dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs, Phys Rev E, 73, Article 067103 pp. (2006)
[44] Perc, M., Coherence resonance in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, New J Phys, 8, 22 (2006)
[45] Perc, M.; Marhl, M., Evolutionary and dynamical coherence resonance in the pair approximated prisoner’s dilemma game, New J Phys, 8, 142 (2006)
[46] Tanimoto, J., Promotion of cooperation by payoff noise in a 262 game, Phys Rev E, 76, Article 041130 pp. (2007)
[47] Traulsen, A.; Nowak, MA; Pacheco, JM, Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection, J Theor Biol, 244, 349-356 (2007) · Zbl 1450.91006
[48] Wang, Z.; Bauch, CT; Bhattacharyya, S.; d’Onofrio, A.; Manfredi, P.; Perc, M.; Perra, N.; Salathé, M.; Zhao, DW, Statistical physics of vaccination, Phys Rep, 664, 9, 1-113 (2016) · Zbl 1359.92111
[49] Yang, HX; Rong, ZH, Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game, Chaos Solitons Fract, 77, 230-234 (2015) · Zbl 1353.91017
[50] Chen, YS; Yang, HX; Guo, WZ, Promotion of cooperation by payoff-driven migration, Phys A Stat Mech Appl, 450, 506-514 (2016)
[51] Yang, HX; Rong, ZH; Wang, WX, Cooperation percolation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, New J Phys, 16, 1, 13010-13020 (2015)
[52] Deng, XY; Zhang, ZP; Deng, Y.; Liu, Q.; Chang, SH, Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice, Appl Math Comput, 284, 322-331 (2016) · Zbl 1410.91226
[53] Wang, Z.; Kokubo, S.; Jusup, M.; Tanimoto, J., Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games, Phys Life Rev, 14, 1-30 (2015)
[54] Wang, Z.; Andrews, MA; Wu, ZX; Wang, L.; Bauch, CT, Coupled disease-behavior dynamics on complex networks: a review, Phys Life Rev, 15, 1-29 (2015), Review Article
[55] Wang, Z.; Wang, L.; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium, Euro Phys J B, 88, 5, 1-15 (2015)
[56] Deng, XY; Han, D.; Dezert, J.; Deng, Y.; Shyr, Y., Evidence combination from an evolutionary game theory perspective, IEEE Trans Cybern, 46, 9, 2070-2082 (2016)
[57] Deng, XY; Zhang, Q.; Deng, Y.; Wang, Z., A novel framework of classical and quantum prisoner’s dilemma games on coupled networks, Sci Rep, 6, 23024 (2016)
[58] Deng, XY; Liu, Q.; Sadiq, R.; Deng, Y., Impact of roles assignation on heterogeneous populations in evolutionary dictator game, Sci Rep, 4 (2014), 6937-6937 · Zbl 1305.46008
[59] Ma, YJ; Lu, J.; Shi, L., Diversity of neighborhoods promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas, Phys A Stat Mech Appl, 468, 212-218 (2016) · Zbl 1400.91069
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.