Beißner, Patrick; Khan, M. Ali On Hurwicz-Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games under incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1411.91012 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 470-490 (2019). MSC: 91A05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Beißner} and \textit{M. A. Khan}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 470--490 (2019; Zbl 1411.91012) Full Text: DOI
Abdellaoui, Mohammed; Kemel, Emmanuel; Panin, Amma; Vieider, Ferdinand M. Measuring time and risk preferences in an integrated framework. (English) Zbl 1411.91206 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 459-469 (2019). MSC: 91B08 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Abdellaoui} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 115, 459--469 (2019; Zbl 1411.91206) Full Text: DOI
Le Van, Cuong; Navrouzoglou, Paulina; Vailakis, Yiannis On endogenous formation of price expectations. (English) Zbl 1411.91240 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 436-458 (2019). MSC: 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{C. Le Van} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 115, 436--458 (2019; Zbl 1411.91240) Full Text: DOI
Kets, Willemien; Sandroni, Alvaro A belief-based theory of homophily. (English) Zbl 1411.91208 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 410-435 (2019). MSC: 91B08 91A05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. Kets} and \textit{A. Sandroni}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 410--435 (2019; Zbl 1411.91208) Full Text: DOI
Metzger, Lars Peter; Rieger, Marc Oliver Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies. (English) Zbl 1411.91026 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 396-409 (2019). MSC: 91A10 91B16 60E15 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. P. Metzger} and \textit{M. O. Rieger}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 396--409 (2019; Zbl 1411.91026) Full Text: DOI
Wang, Siyu; Houser, Daniel Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude. (English) Zbl 1411.91129 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 381-395 (2019). MSC: 91A28 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Wang} and \textit{D. Houser}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 381--395 (2019; Zbl 1411.91129) Full Text: DOI
Valizadeh, Mehrdad; Gohari, Amin Playing games with bounded entropy. (English) Zbl 1411.91077 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 363-380 (2019). MSC: 91A20 94A17 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Valizadeh} and \textit{A. Gohari}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 363--380 (2019; Zbl 1411.91077) Full Text: DOI arXiv
Haenni, Simon Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter? On the demotivational effect of losing in repeated competitions. (English) Zbl 1411.91072 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 346-362 (2019). MSC: 91A20 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Haenni}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 346--362 (2019; Zbl 1411.91072) Full Text: DOI
Schulman, Leonard J.; Vazirani, Umesh V. The duality gap for two-team zero-sum games. (English) Zbl 1411.91016 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 336-345 (2019). MSC: 91A05 91A06 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. J. Schulman} and \textit{U. V. Vazirani}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 336--345 (2019; Zbl 1411.91016) Full Text: DOI
Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia A theory of esteem based peer pressure. (English) Zbl 1411.91212 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 314-335 (2019). MSC: 91B10 91B08 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{F. Adriani} and \textit{S. Sonderegger}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 314--335 (2019; Zbl 1411.91212) Full Text: DOI
Dimakopoulos, Philipp D.; Heller, C.-Philipp Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers. (English) Zbl 1411.91353 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 289-313 (2019). MSC: 91B40 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. D. Dimakopoulos} and \textit{C. P. Heller}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 289--313 (2019; Zbl 1411.91353) Full Text: DOI
Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete. (English) Zbl 1411.91256 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 265-288 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D.-S. Jeon} and \textit{D. Menicucci}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 265--288 (2019; Zbl 1411.91256) Full Text: DOI
Talamàs, Eduard Price dispersion in stationary networked markets. (English) Zbl 1411.91245 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 247-264 (2019). MSC: 91B24 91B26 91A10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{E. Talamàs}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 247--264 (2019; Zbl 1411.91245) Full Text: DOI
Alcalde, José; Dahm, Matthias Dual sourcing with price discovery. (English) Zbl 1411.91251 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 225-246 (2019). MSC: 91B26 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Alcalde} and \textit{M. Dahm}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 225--246 (2019; Zbl 1411.91251) Full Text: DOI
Dong, Lu; Falvey, Rod; Luckraz, Shravan Fair share and social efficiency: a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division. (English) Zbl 1411.91332 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 209-224 (2019). MSC: 91B32 91A18 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Dong} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 115, 209--224 (2019; Zbl 1411.91332) Full Text: DOI
Rosato, Antonio; Tymula, Agnieszka A. Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: money ain’t no good. (English) Zbl 1411.91262 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 188-208 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. Rosato} and \textit{A. A. Tymula}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 188--208 (2019; Zbl 1411.91262) Full Text: DOI
Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin; Romm, Assaf Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules. (English) Zbl 1411.91417 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 167-187 (2019). MSC: 91B68 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{I. Ashlagi} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 115, 167--187 (2019; Zbl 1411.91417) Full Text: DOI
Shadmehr, Mehdi; Bernhardt, Dan Vanguards in revolution. (English) Zbl 1411.91076 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 146-166 (2019). MSC: 91A20 91A05 91F10 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Shadmehr} and \textit{D. Bernhardt}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 146--166 (2019; Zbl 1411.91076) Full Text: DOI
Bavly, Gilad; Peretz, Ron Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory. (English) Zbl 1411.91070 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 131-145 (2019). MSC: 91A20 68Q45 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{G. Bavly} and \textit{R. Peretz}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 131--145 (2019; Zbl 1411.91070) Full Text: DOI
van Veelen, Matthijs; García, Julián In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs. (English) Zbl 1411.91078 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 113-130 (2019). MSC: 91A20 91A22 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. van Veelen} and \textit{J. García}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 113--130 (2019; Zbl 1411.91078) Full Text: DOI
Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron Bid caps in large contests. (English) Zbl 1411.91259 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 101-112 (2019). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{W. Olszewski} and \textit{R. Siegel}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 101--112 (2019; Zbl 1411.91259) Full Text: DOI
Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study. (English) Zbl 1411.91418 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 83-100 (2019). MSC: 91B68 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{Y. Chen} and \textit{O. Kesten}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 83--100 (2019; Zbl 1411.91418) Full Text: DOI
Castillo, Marco E.; Cross, Philip J.; Freer, Mikhail Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal-response games. (English) Zbl 1411.91169 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 60-82 (2019). MSC: 91A90 91A10 91A05 91B16 91B08 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. E. Castillo} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 115, 60--82 (2019; Zbl 1411.91169) Full Text: DOI
Dickinson, David L.; McElroy, Todd Bayesian versus heuristic-based choice under sleep restriction and suboptimal times of day. (English) Zbl 1411.91185 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 48-59 (2019). MSC: 91B06 91A90 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. L. Dickinson} and \textit{T. McElroy}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 48--59 (2019; Zbl 1411.91185) Full Text: DOI
Richter, Michael Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents. (English) Zbl 1411.91131 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 30-47 (2019). MSC: 91A40 91B15 91B32 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{M. Richter}, Games Econ. Behav. 115, 30--47 (2019; Zbl 1411.91131) Full Text: DOI
Battigalli, P.; Catonini, E.; Lanzani, G.; Marinacci, M. Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games. (English) Zbl 1411.91069 Games Econ. Behav. 115, 1-29 (2019). MSC: 91A20 91A18 91A26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Battigalli} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 115, 1--29 (2019; Zbl 1411.91069) Full Text: DOI