Vidal-Puga, Juan; Bergantiños, Gustavo An implementation of the Owen value. (English) Zbl 1072.91010 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 412-427 (2003). Reviewer: Tadeusz Radzik (Jelenia Góra) MSC: 91A12 91A06 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Vidal-Puga} and \textit{G. Bergantiños}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 412--427 (2003; Zbl 1072.91010) Full Text: DOI
Sonsino, Doron; Sirota, Julia Strategic pattern recognition – experimental evidence. (English) Zbl 1056.91010 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 390-411 (2003). MSC: 91A20 91A90 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. Sonsino} and \textit{J. Sirota}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 390--411 (2003; Zbl 1056.91010) Full Text: DOI
Shinotsuka, Tomoichi; Takamiya, Koji The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. (English) Zbl 1056.91006 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 379-389 (2003). MSC: 91A12 91B14 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Shinotsuka} and \textit{K. Takamiya}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 379--389 (2003; Zbl 1056.91006) Full Text: DOI
Sandholm, William H. Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information. (English) Zbl 1089.91007 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 343-378 (2003). Reviewer: Vladimir Mazalov (Petrozavodsk) MSC: 91A22 91A15 60H10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{W. H. Sandholm}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 343--378 (2003; Zbl 1089.91007) Full Text: DOI
Samuelson, Larry; Swinkels, Jeroen M. Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. (English) Zbl 1056.91012 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 332-342 (2003). MSC: 91A22 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{L. Samuelson} and \textit{J. M. Swinkels}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 332--342 (2003; Zbl 1056.91012) Full Text: DOI
Núñez, Marina; Rafels, Carles Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game. (English) Zbl 1072.91007 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 311-331 (2003). Reviewer: Tadeusz Radzik (Jelenia Góra) MSC: 91A12 91A06 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Núñez} and \textit{C. Rafels}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 311--331 (2003; Zbl 1072.91007) Full Text: DOI
Eliaz, Kfir Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts. (English) Zbl 1056.91008 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 286-310 (2003). MSC: 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{K. Eliaz}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 286--310 (2003; Zbl 1056.91008) Full Text: DOI
Einy, Ezra; Moreno, Diego; Shitovitz, Benyamin The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly. (English) Zbl 1064.91038 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 272-285 (2003). Reviewer: Vangelis Grigoroudis (Chania) MSC: 91B26 91A80 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Einy} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 272--285 (2003; Zbl 1064.91038) Full Text: DOI
Blume, Lawrence E. How noise matters. (English) Zbl 1056.91011 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 251-271 (2003). MSC: 91A22 91B68 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{L. E. Blume}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 251--271 (2003; Zbl 1056.91011) Full Text: DOI
Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Kahneman, Michael Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. (English) Zbl 1056.91007 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 227-250 (2003). MSC: 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Ben-Porath} and \textit{M. Kahneman}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 227--250 (2003; Zbl 1056.91007) Full Text: DOI
Baye, Michael R.; Hoppe, Heidrun C. The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. (English) Zbl 1056.91015 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 217-226 (2003). MSC: 91A70 91A10 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. R. Baye} and \textit{H. C. Hoppe}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 217--226 (2003; Zbl 1056.91015) Full Text: DOI
Abreu, Dilip; Sethi, Rajiv Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. (English) Zbl 1061.91005 Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 195-216 (2003). Reviewer: Vasile Postolică (Piatra Neamt) MSC: 91A22 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. Abreu} and \textit{R. Sethi}, Games Econ. Behav. 44, No. 2, 195--216 (2003; Zbl 1061.91005) Full Text: DOI