Sadanand, Asha; Sadanand, Venkatraman Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility. (English) Zbl 0870.90048 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 516-530 (1996). MSC: 91B26 93E03 91A65 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Sadanand} and \textit{V. Sadanand}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 516--530 (1996; Zbl 0870.90048) Full Text: DOI
Piccione, Michele; Tan, Guofu A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions. (English) Zbl 0870.90045 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 501-515 (1996). MSC: 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Piccione} and \textit{G. Tan}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 501--515 (1996; Zbl 0870.90045) Full Text: DOI Link
Conlon, John R. Cooperation for pennies: A note on \(\varepsilon\)-equilibria. (English) Zbl 0866.90147 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 489-500 (1996). MSC: 91A20 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. R. Conlon}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 489--500 (1996; Zbl 0866.90147) Full Text: DOI
Dudey, Marc Dynamic monopoly with nondurable goods. (English) Zbl 0870.90044 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 470-488 (1996). MSC: 91B26 91A40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Dudey}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 470--488 (1996; Zbl 0870.90044) Full Text: DOI
Aoyagi, Masaki Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games. (English) Zbl 0871.90133 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 444-469 (1996). MSC: 91A20 91E40 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Aoyagi}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 444--469 (1996; Zbl 0871.90133) Full Text: DOI
Arya, Anil; Glover, Jonathan; Young, Richard Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity. (English) Zbl 0870.90012 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 420-443 (1996). MSC: 91B14 91B44 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. Arya} et al., J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 420--443 (1996; Zbl 0870.90012) Full Text: DOI
Chambers, Robert G.; Chung, Yangho; Färe, Rolf Benefit and distance functions. (English) Zbl 0866.90027 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 407-419 (1996). MSC: 91B38 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. G. Chambers} et al., J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 407--419 (1996; Zbl 0866.90027) Full Text: DOI Link
Volij, Oscar Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence. (English) Zbl 0869.90090 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 391-406 (1996). MSC: 91A05 91B16 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{O. Volij}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 391--406 (1996; Zbl 0869.90090) Full Text: DOI Link
Burke, Jonathan L. Equilibrium for overlapping generations in continuous time. (English) Zbl 0870.90034 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 364-390 (1996). MSC: 91B62 91B50 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. L. Burke}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 364--390 (1996; Zbl 0870.90034) Full Text: DOI Link
Peck, James Demand uncertainty, incomplete markets, and the optimality of rationing. (English) Zbl 0866.90052 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 342-363 (1996). MSC: 91B26 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Peck}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 342--363 (1996; Zbl 0866.90052) Full Text: DOI
Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew F. Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization. (English) Zbl 0866.90083 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 312-341 (1996). MSC: 90B70 91B38 91B50 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. Legros} and \textit{A. F. Newman}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 312--341 (1996; Zbl 0866.90083) Full Text: DOI DOI
Reny, Philip J.; Wooders, Myrna Holtz The partnered core of a game without side payments. (English) Zbl 0871.90125 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 298-311 (1996). MSC: 91A12 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{P. J. Reny} and \textit{M. H. Wooders}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 298--311 (1996; Zbl 0871.90125) Full Text: DOI
Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Kahneman, Michael Communication in repeated games with private monitoring. (English) Zbl 0871.90134 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 281-297 (1996). MSC: 91A20 91A28 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Ben-Porath} and \textit{M. Kahneman}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 281--297 (1996; Zbl 0871.90134) Full Text: DOI