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Two-round man-in-the-middle security from LPN. (English) Zbl 1378.94074
Kushilevitz, Eyal (ed.) et al., Theory of cryptography. 13th international conference, TCC 2016-A, Tel Aviv, Israel, January 10–13, 2016. Proceedings. Part I. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-662-49095-2/pbk; 978-3-662-49096-9/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9562, 225-248 (2016).
Summary: Secret-key authentication protocols have recently received a considerable amount of attention, and a long line of research has been devoted to devising efficient protocols with security based on the hardness of the learning-parity with noise (LPN) problem, with the goal of achieving low communication and round complexities, as well as highest possible security guarantees.
In this paper, we construct 2-round authentication protocols that are secure against sequential man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks with tight reductions to LPN, Field-LPN, or other problems. The best prior protocols had either loose reductions and required 3 rounds [V. Lyubashevsky and D. Masny, Crypto 2013, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 8043, 308–325 (2013; Zbl 1316.94102)] or had a much larger key [E. Kiltz et al., Eurocrypt 2011, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 6632, 7–26 (2011; Zbl 1281.94083)], and Y. Dodis et al. [Eurocrypt 2012, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 7237, 355–374 (2012; Zbl 1297.94117)]. Our constructions follow from a new generic deterministic and round-preserving transformation enhancing actively-secure protocols of a special form to be sequentially MIM-secure while only adding a limited amount of key material and computation.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1331.94002].

MSC:
94A62 Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing
Software:
HB-MP
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