A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation.

*(English)*Zbl 1269.91051Summary: This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost-sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Y. Wang [Econ. Lett. 64, No. 2, 187–192 (1999; Zbl 0971.91509)]. To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non-decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined.

##### MSC:

91B38 | Production theory, theory of the firm |

91A12 | Cooperative games |

91B15 | Welfare economics |

91B32 | Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) |

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\textit{E. Bahel} and \textit{C. Trudeau}, Int. J. Game Theory 42, No. 2, 439--460 (2013; Zbl 1269.91051)

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