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Unwinding modal paradoxes on digraphs. (English) Zbl 07345739

Summary: The unwinding that Cook (J. Symbol. Log. 69(3), 767-774 2004) proposed is a simple but powerful method of generating new paradoxes from known ones. This paper extends Cook’s unwinding to a larger class of paradoxes and studies further the basic properties of the unwinding. The unwinding we study is a procedure, by which when inputting a Boolean modal net together with a definable digraph, we get a set of sentences in which we have a ‘counterpart’ for each sentence of the Boolean modal net and each point of the digraph. What is more, whenever a sentence of the Boolean modal net says another sentence is necessary, then the counterpart of the first sentence at a point correspondingly says the counterparts of the second one at all accessible points of that point are all true. The output of the procedure is called ‘the unwinding of a Boolean modal net on a definable digraph’. We prove that the unwinding procedure preserves paradoxicality: a Boolean modal net is paradoxical on a definable digraph, iff the unwinding of it on this digraph is also paradoxical. Besides, the dependence digraph for the unwinding of a Boolean modal net on a definable digraph is proved to be isomorphic to the unwinding of the dependence digraph for the Boolean modal net on the previous definable digraph. So the unwinding of a Boolean modal net on a digraph is self-referential, iff the Boolean modal net is self-referential and the digraph is cyclic. Thus, on the one hand, the unwinding of any Boolean modal net on an acyclic digraph is non-self-referential. In particular, the unwinding of any Boolean modal net on \(\langle\mathbb{N},<\rangle\) is non-self-referential. On the other hand, if a Boolean modal net is paradoxical on a locally finite digraph, the unwinding of it on that digraph must be self-referential. Hence, starting from a Boolean modal paradox, the unwinding can output a non-self-referential paradox only if the digraph is not locally finite.

MSC:

03-XX Mathematical logic and foundations
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