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Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders. (English) Zbl 1431.91056

Summary: We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

MSC:

91A28 Signaling and communication in game theory
91A11 Equilibrium refinements
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References:

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