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On the CCA2 security of McEliece in the standard model. (English) Zbl 1421.94068
Baek, Joonsang (ed.) et al., Provable security. 12th international conference, ProvSec 2018, Jeju, South Korea, October 25–28, 2018. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 11192, 165-181 (2018).
Summary: In this paper we study public-key encryption schemes based on error-correcting codes that are IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model. In particular, we analyze a protocol due to Dowsley, Müller-Quade and Nascimento [D. Dowsley et al., CT-RSA 2009, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 5473, 240–251 (2009; Zbl 1237.94060)], based on a work of [A. Rosen and G. Segev, TCC 2009, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 5444, 419–436 (2009; Zbl 1213.94130), SIAM J. Comput. 39, No. 7, 3058–3088 (2010; Zbl 1227.94063)]. The original formulation of the protocol contained some ambiguities and incongruences, which we point out and correct; moreover, the protocol deviates substantially from the work it is based on. We then present a construction which resembles more closely the original Rosen-Segev framework, and show how this can be instantiated with the McEliece scheme.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1398.94007].

94A60 Cryptography
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