Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions.

*(English)*Zbl 1410.91311Summary: In a resource allocation problem, there is a common-pool resource, which has to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim on this pool and an individual concave reward function on assigned resources, thus generalizing the model of
Grundel et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 78(2):149-169, 2013)
with linear reward functions. An assignment of resources is optimal if the total joint reward is maximized. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of an assignment, based on bilateral transfers of resources only. Analyzing the associated allocation problem of the maximal total joint reward, we consider corresponding resource allocation games. It is shown that the core and the nucleolus of a resource allocation game are equal to the core and the nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy game.

##### MSC:

91B32 | Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) |

91A12 | Cooperative games |

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