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Computation of Stackelberg equilibria of finite sequential games. (English) Zbl 1404.91022
Markakis, Evangelos (ed.) et al., Web and internet economics. 11th international conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9–12, 2015. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-662-48994-9/pbk; 978-3-662-48995-6/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9470, 201-215 (2015).
Summary: The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1326.68026].
91A20 Multistage and repeated games
91A65 Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
91A05 2-person games
68Q17 Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
Full Text: DOI
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