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The optimal majority threshold as a function of the variation coefficient of the environment. (English. Russian original) Zbl 1397.91167

Autom. Remote Control 79, No. 4, 725-736 (2018); translation from Upr. Bol’sh. Sist. 2016, No. 62, 169-187 (2016).
Summary: Within the model of social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a stochastic environment (ViSE model), we consider the case of a homogeneous society consisting of classically rational economic agents (or homines economici, or egoists). We present expressions for the optimal majority threshold and the maximum expected capital increment as functions of the parameters of the environment. An estimate of the rate of change of the optimal threshold at zero is given, which is an absolute constant: \((\sqrt {2/\pi } - \sqrt {\pi /2} )/2\) .

MSC:

91B12 Voting theory
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References:

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