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How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? (English) Zbl 1393.91029

Summary: This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

MSC:

91A90 Experimental studies
91A28 Signaling and communication in game theory
91A10 Noncooperative games

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