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Egalitarian-utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem. (English) Zbl 1378.91097
Summary: For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is “between” the relative (or normalized) utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian (i.e., Kalai-Smorodinsky) point. Also, it is “between” the (non-normalized) utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash’s bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash’s IIA.
Reviewer: Reviewer (Berlin)

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A12 Cooperative games
Full Text: DOI
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