zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group. (English) Zbl 1369.91043
Summary: We consider a setup where agents care about i) taking actions that are close to their preferences, and ii) coordinating with others. The preferences of agents in the same group are drawn from the same distribution. Each individual is exogenously matched with other agents randomly selected from the population. Starting from an environment where everyone belongs to the same group, we show that introducing agents from a different group (whose preferences are uncorrelated with those of each of the incumbents) generates costs but may also (surprisingly) generate benefits in the form of enhanced coordination.

91B06 Decision theory
Full Text: DOI
[1] Adriani, F.; Sonderegger, S., Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? an information-based theory, J. Public Econ., 93, 11/12, 1119-1124, (2009)
[2] Akerlof, G. A.; Kranton, R., Economics and identity, Q. J. Econ., 115, 3, 715-753, (2000)
[3] Alesina, A.; La Ferrara, E., Participation in heterogeneous communities, Q. J. Econ., 115, 3, 847-904, (2000)
[4] Alesina, A.; La Ferrara, E., Who trusts others?, J. Public Econ., 85, 2, 207-234, (2002)
[5] Alesina, A.; La Ferrara, E., Ethnic diversity and economic performance, J. Econ. Lit., 43, 3, 762-800, (2005)
[6] Alonso, R.; Dessein, W.; Matouschek, N., When does coordination require centralization?, Am. Econ. Rev., 98, 1, 145-179, (2008)
[7] Angeletos, G. M.; Pavan, A., Transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities, Am. Econ. Rev., 94, 2, 91-98, (2004)
[8] Angeletos, G. M.; Pavan, A., Efficient use of information and social value of information, Econometrica, 7, 4, 1103-1142, (2007) · Zbl 1133.91039
[9] Angeletos, G. M.; Pavan, A., Socially optimal coordination: characterization and policy implications, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc., 5, 2-3, 585-593, (2007)
[10] Arrow, K. J., The theory of discrimination, (Ashenfelter, O.; Rees, A., Discrimination in Labor Markets, (1973), Princeton University Press Princeton (NJ))
[11] Becker, G. S., The economics of discrimination, (1957), University of Chicago Press Chicago (IL)
[12] Bednar, J.; Bramson, A.; Jones-Rooy, A.; Page, S. E., Emergent cultural signatures and persistent diversity: a model of conformity and consistency, Ration. Soc., 22, 4, 407-444, (2010)
[13] Bolton, P.; Brunnermeier, M.; Veldkamp, L., Economists’ perspectives on leadership, (Nohria, N.; Khurana, R., Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice, (2010), Harvard Business Press Boston, MA)
[14] Bolton, P.; Brunnermeier, M.; Veldkamp, L., Leadership, coordination and mission-driven management, Rev. Econ. Stud., 80, 2, 512-537, (2013) · Zbl 1264.91030
[15] Colombo, L.; Femminis, G.; Pavan, A., Information acquisition and welfare, Rev. Econ. Stud., 81, 4, 1187-1483, (2014)
[16] Cornand, C.; Heinemann, F., Optimal degree of public information dissemination, Econ. J., 118, 528, 718-742, (2008)
[17] Dessein, W.; Santos, T., Adaptive organizations, J. Polit. Econ., 114, 5, 956-995, (2006)
[18] Dewan, T.; Myatt, D. P., The qualities of leadership: direction, communication, and obfuscation, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 102, 3, 351-368, (2008)
[19] Hellwig, C., 2005. Heterogeneous information and the welfare effects of public information disclosures. Mimeo.
[20] Hofstede, G., Culture’s consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations, (2001), Sage Publications Thousand Oaks (CA)
[21] Hong, L.; Page, S. E., Problem solving by heterogeneous agents, J. Econ. Theory, 97, 1, 123-163, (2001) · Zbl 1013.91030
[22] Inglehart, R., Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies, (1997), Princeton University Press Princeton (NJ)
[23] Kuran, T.; Sandholm, W. H., Cultural integration and its discontents, Rev. Econ. Stud., 75, 1, 201-228, (2008) · Zbl 1141.91658
[24] Lazear, E. P., Culture and language, J. Polit. Econ., 107, 6, S95-S126, (1999)
[25] March, J. G., Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning, Organ. Sci., 2, 71-87, (1991)
[26] Morris, S.; Shin, H. S., Social value of public information, Am. Econ. Rev., 92, 5, 1521-1534, (2002)
[27] Morris, S.; Shin, H. S., Heterogeneity and uniqueness in interaction games, (Blume, L.; Durlauf, S., The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, (2005), Oxford University Press New York)
[28] Myatt, D.; Wallace, C., Endogenous information acquisition in coordination games, Rev. Econ. Stud., 79, 1, 340-374, (2012)
[29] Prat, A., Should a team be homogeneous?, Eur. Econ. Rev., 46, 7, 1187-1207, (2002)
[30] Quillian, L., Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe, Am. Sociol. Rev., 60, 4, 586-611, (1995)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.