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Matching with aggregate externalities. (English) Zbl 1347.91204
Summary: Certain aggregate externalities, like those due to knowledge and public goods, do not change very much in response to changes in two individuals’ actions. Thus, individuals rationally regard the level of the externality as fixed in their negotiations with each other. We leverage this observation to develop a general framework for the existence of stable matchings in moderately sized one-to-one matching games, and we characterize intuitive restrictions on preferences that are sufficient for existence.

91B68 Matching models
91A12 Cooperative games
Full Text: DOI
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