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Hyper-stable collective rankings. (English) Zbl 1331.91072
Summary: We introduce a new consistency property for social welfare functions (SWF), called hyper-stability. An SWF is hyper-stable if at any profile over finitely many alternatives where a weak order $$R$$ is chosen, there exists a profile of linear orders over linear orders, called hyper-profile, at which only linearizations of $$R$$ are ranked first by the SWF. Profiles induce hyper-profiles according to some minimal compatibility conditions. We provide sufficient conditions for hyper-stability, and we investigate hyper-stability for several Condorcet SWFs. An important conclusion is that there are non-dictatorial hyper-stable SWFs.

##### MSC:
 91B14 Social choice
Full Text:
##### References:
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