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Quantifying information leakage of randomized protocols. (English) Zbl 1329.68188
Giacobazzi, Roberto (ed.) et al., Verification, model checking, and abstract interpretation. 14th international conference, VMCAI 2013, Rome, Italy, January 20–22, 2013. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-35872-2/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7737, 68-87 (2013).
Summary: The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1298.68027].

MSC:
68Q87 Probability in computer science (algorithm analysis, random structures, phase transitions, etc.)
68M12 Network protocols
68Q60 Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.)
94A60 Cryptography
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