Improved zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the ISIS problem, and applications.

*(English)*Zbl 1314.94087
Kurosawa, Kaoru (ed.) et al., Public-key cryptography – PKC 2013. 16th international conference on practice and theory in public-key cryptography, Nara, Japan, February 26–March 1, 2013. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-36361-0/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7778, 107-124 (2013).

Summary: In all existing efficient proofs of knowledge of a solution to the infinity norm inhomogeneous small integer solution \((\text{ISIS}^{ \infty })\) problem, the knowledge extractor outputs a solution vector that is only guaranteed to be \(\widetilde{O}(n)\) times longer than the witness possessed by the prover. As a consequence, in many cryptographic schemes that use these proof systems as building blocks, there exists a gap between the hardness of solving the underlying \(\text{ISIS}^{ \infty }\) problem and the hardness underlying the security reductions. In this paper, we generalize Stern’s protocol to obtain two statistical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the \(\text{ISIS}^{ \infty }\) problem that remove this gap. Our result yields the potential of relying on weaker security assumptions for various lattice-based cryptographic constructions. As applications of our proof system, we introduce a concurrently secure identity-based identification scheme based on the worst-case hardness of the \(\text{SIVP}_{{\widetilde{O}}(n^{1.5})}\) problem (in the \(\ell _{2}\) norm) in general lattices in the random oracle model, and an efficient statistical zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge with small constant gap factor for Regev’s encryption scheme.

For the entire collection see [Zbl 1258.94004].

For the entire collection see [Zbl 1258.94004].