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Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations. (English) Zbl 1290.91055
Summary: An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one’s own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet-Kemeny aggregation method.

MSC:
91B14 Social choice
91B08 Individual preferences
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