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An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit. (English) Zbl 1283.91049

Summary: We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.

MSC:

91B12 Voting theory
91A80 Applications of game theory
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References:

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